All Posts
September 2020
South Korea's Chief Nuke Negotiator on Decoding Pyongyang by Jee Abbey Lee
Open Nuclear Network (ONN) is currently in the process of compiling a network of trusted third parties known as the ONN Engagement Network. As former officials from high-level diplomatic and military positions around the globe, they will be provided with data-driven analysis from ONN to utilize in nuclear de-escalation efforts in their respective countries. From South Korea, former Chief Negotiator to Six Party Talks Ambassador Chun Yung-woo is one of the members.
June 2020
Explainer: Why "Leafleting" to North Korea Ruffles Feathers by Jee Abbey Lee
Throughout the month of June, North Korea has shown increased hostility toward South Korea. Some of these efforts include re-installing loudspeakers along the Demilitarised Zone at one point before removing them, blowing up a joint liaison office in its territory and announcing plans for a massive anti-South Korea leafleting.
May 2020
Nuclear Risk Reduction and COVID-19: What One Existential Threat Can Teach Us about Another by Laura Rockwood, Veronika Bedenko
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, competing international security priorities including arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, are taking a back seat. The delayed response to COVID-19 suggests some troubling analogies to the current state of affairs in the nuclear arena.
March 2020
Analysis of the KN-25 Multiple Rocket Launcher System after the 9 March 2020 DPRK Test by Tianran Xu
"Modern warfare is precisely the warfare of artillery pieces and the combat preparations of the artillerymen are exactly those of the People's Army." - Kim Jong Un, 12 March 2020
November 2019
North Korea's Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles & Countermeasures by Melissa Hanham
Every state that has developed intercontinental ballistic missiles has considered how to deliver a nuclear payload to its target without interference. Generally, states counter ballistic missile defence (BMD) by increasing the number of missiles they produce, developing countermeasures and penetration aides such as decoys or chaff - which confuse BMD sensors, or increasing the number of warheads in each missile's payload.
November 2019
Countering Ballistic Missile Defence: North Korea's Approach by Melissa Hanham
North Korea's rapid development of missile capabilities has prioritized technological advancement, range, and payload delivery in order to achieve Kim Jong Un's goal of delivering a nuclear weapon to the US mainland. Being able to nuke the continental US isn't just to live up to the hype of the propaganda, but because it's a very effective wedge between the US and its ally South Korea.
November 2019
Image Analysis of North Korea's ICBMs for Countermeasures by Melissa Hanham
While there is insufficient evidence to prove that North Korea is pursuing countermeasures or penetration aids (penaids), the lack of evidence certainly does not prove that they are not. The technology behind producing penaids - or still more dangerous - multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) is difficult, but not more difficult than what North Korea has already accomplished.
