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In recent weeks, as reported in the Event Horizon, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have escalated following alleged drone incursions over Pyongyang in October. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) has ordered its frontline artillery units along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to be on high alert, ready to open fire. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that millions of young North Koreans have volunteered to join or rejoin the KPA in response to these provocations, blaming "ROK scum" (South Korea) for sending drones over the capital. On 15 October, North Korea even blew up roads connecting the two countries.
Is Pyongyang preparing for war with the South?
North Korea is doubling down on hostility and theatrics. But does it mean a looming major invasion? Probably not. Even without the redeployment of US nuclear weapons to the South, South Korean and US armed forces possess comprehensive and overwhelming superiorities in both conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities. A major invasion against the South may very well lead to the end of Pyongyang’s rule. Kim Jong Un is likely aware of this power imbalance. After the South paraded its “monster” missile designed to strike North Korean underground bunkers, Kim Jong Un made it clear in a public speech on 8 October that he did not have the intention to invade the South. In fact, he stated that he did not even have the slightest interest in South Korea:
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To be honest, we have no intention of attacking the Republic of Korea. Thinking of it is abominable, and we hate dealing with those in it. Formerly, we often spoke about liberating the south and reunification by force of arms, but now we are not interested in it. And since our statement about two separate states, we have been all the more unwilling to be conscious of the state in the south. |
According to the KCNA, the serving of roads leading to South Korea was a measure “taken in keeping with the requirement of the DPRK Constitution which clearly defines the ROK as a hostile state.” [1] This is one of Pyongyang's latest, and perhaps most dramatic, moves since North Korea revised its inter-Korean policy at the end of 2023, prioritising hostility over reconciliation and reunification. Kim Jong Un himself said on 17 October that the blocking of roads was intended to sever ties with South Korea, “a complete enemy state,” both physically and psychologically:
| Recalling that we completely blocked the roads and railways to the territory of the ROK two days ago through blasting, he said that it means not only the physical closure but also the end of the evil relationship with Seoul which persistently lasted century after century and the complete removal of the useless awareness about fellow countrymen and unreasonable idea of reunification. |
At a time when the global divide between liberal and illiberal parts of the world is rapidly widening, Pyongyang now views isolation from the West and closer alignment with illiberal powers as its path to survival and growth. The deepening strategic partnership with Moscow aligns with Pyongyang’s shifting policy toward Seoul. To borrow a popular term, [2] this approach might also be described as a “small yard, high fence,” with backdoors left open to Russia and, maybe to a lesser extent, China.
Last but not least, as North Korea sends its elite troops to participate in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Pyongyang would not want to appear vulnerable at home. The military tension along the inter-Korean border could create the impression that the KPA is prepared to fight on the Peninsula and that Pyongyang is aiding Russia from a position of strength.
What’s the risk at the moment?
If no major invasions against the South are on the horizon, what’s the current risk that might lead to armed conflicts on the Peninsula? Pyongyang’s allegation of South Korean drones provides a useful case study for the potential escalation of conflict.
South Korean activists have been previously sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets via uncontrolled balloons. In turn, North Korea responded with their own “trash and manure” carrying balloons to the South. [3] The South Korean government has been trying to stop these activists, triggering a domestic debate over the right to free speech.
Using drones to scatter leaflets is obviously an upgrade and also more provocative. Drones have become an indispensable asset in modern warfare, and a leaflet-dropping drone penetrates North Korea’s physical and psychological fence with great efficiency and precision.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff neither confirmed nor denied Pyongyang’s allegations. However, there are three possibilities regarding this incident:
1) Activist groups in South Korea send the drone.
2) The South Korean military sent the drone.
3) Pyongyang staged the incident.
As the crashed drone showcased by KCNA bears an uncanny resemblance to the small long-range reconnaissance drones of the South Korean military, it seems likely that either the South Korean military or a South Korean activist group, which somehow gained access to military-use drones, was behind the incident.
A drone recovered in Pyongyang (left) shares an uncanny resemblance to a type of small long-range reconnaissance drone employed by the South Korean military (right).
Image: Kim Min-seok
In addition, considering the content of the leaflets, the possibility that North Korea staged the incident is low. According to South Korean media:
| The top of the leaflet to North Korea said, "Kim Jong-un is busy filling up his stomach." Also at the bottom of it was a photo of Chairman Kim wearing a Swiss-made luxury watch and his daughter Joo-ae wearing a French luxury brand Christian Dior padded jacket…In addition, the leaflet described a comparison of the income gap between South Korea and North Koreans by the purchase gap between rice and corn under the title "Compare Food that Can be Purchased with Annual Income." |
Alleged leaflets found in a drone crashed near Pyongyang.
This photo is released by the external-facing Korean Central News Agency.
Kim Jong Un most likely would not approve of this message (let alone its means of delivery). He may feel compelled to respond if incursions continue. Such a response, whether kinetic or not, could lead to further escalations on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is safe to assume that North Korea would want to tread carefully and avoid escalations that could spiral out of control, particularly with its elite troops stationed abroad.
In general, conflict should develop in a controlled manner, as seen in extreme cases like the shelling of Yeonpyeong or the sinking of Cheonan. However, failure to manage an escalation could lead to miscalculations and eventually unintended wars.
After expressing his disinterest in South Korea, Kim Jong Un added in his October 8 speech that “for the Republic of Korea, all that it needs to do in order to guarantee its security is not provoking us...” Many actions could be framed as provocations by North Korea, and the government in Seoul should not be bound by the fear of angering the North. In the author’s view, parading a “monster” missile designed to strike Kim Jong Un’s underground bunkers serves as a deterrence measure. However, it might be wise to avoid seemingly unnecessary provocations, such as flying drones over the North Korean capital to scatter anti-Kim Jong Un leaflets.
Tianran Xu is an Analyst for Open Nuclear Network (ONN), a programme of PAX sapiens. Tianran focuses on North East Asian security and missile systems. Tianran uses photo mensuration to measure the size, range and capacity of missiles. He also analyses photos, videos and satellite imagery to understand nuclear and missile programmes. With a background in media and journalism, Tianran is a regular contributor to Chinese and English open source and science publications. Prior to joining ONN, he worked as a journalist, editor and news assistant at both Chinese and foreign news organisations in Beijing.
Contact: txu@paxsapiens.org
Endnotes
[1] The full text of the revised constitution was not made public. But the KCNA report on blocking the inter-Korean roads indicated that the constitution had defined the South as such.
[2] Used to refer to the economic and technological restrictions of the Biden administration against China.
[3] This method is apparently inefficient for both sides. It was reported that only 10% of the North Korea balloons landed in South Korean territory.
