Abstract
This paper explores lessons to be learned from the process and framework of the negotiations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with regard to conflict mediation and trust-building, especially during the early stages of negotiation. The findings are based on an analysis of numerous interviews with those involved in the JCPOA negotiation process and on the study of relevant publicly available interviews and commentaries. The authors hope that such lessons can be helpful in other conflict contexts where a dialogue between adversaries needs to be restarted with the aim of crisis resolution.
1. INTRODUCTION
The text of the JCPOA explicitly states that the JCPOA "should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and practices."[1] Nonetheless, there are several reasons why, particularly at the time of writing this paper, it is worth examining whether there are lessons that can be learned from the process of the negotiation of the JCPOA that might be applicable to negotiations for similar conflict contexts.
Firstly, the JCPOA case could serve as an example of successful diplomacy, bringing adversarial parties with decades of mutual mistrust and failed attempts at diplomacy to the negotiation table. It is often assumed that such a negative relationship record will prevent progress in overcoming key differences, especially on sensitive issues such as nuclear ones.[2] However, the JCPOA case has shown that diplomacy can bring adversarial parties to a negotiated solution, despite all their political differences, when armed conflict is a possible outcome of diplomatic failure.
Secondly, numerous high-level officials of the States involved in the JCPOA process are likely to be involved in negotiations on similar matters; thus, their experience with the JCPOA negotiations will likely be reflected in a potential future negotiation in other conflict contexts.
Thirdly, it would be reasonable to assume that some other States (e.g. the DPRK) have closely monitored developments surrounding the JCPOA and are likely to have gained insights from their observations.[3]Those insights may have been predominantly negative after the US withdrawal from the deal. It is also possible, however, that most recent attempts by US allies and other parties to the agreement to revive the deal have supported the argument that a multilateral framework could make a deal more sustainable.
Considering the reasons mentioned above, the authors have found that analysing the lessons of the JCPOA could be helpful in understanding and preparing for future similar talks or deals. The lessons discussed in this paper focus on the framework and approach to negotiations that contributed to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA.
With that in mind, the authors conducted a number of interviews with and analysed publicly available commentaries of key individuals who were either directly involved as part of the JCPOA negotiating delegations or were involved at the margins of the process. The following summary reflects the results of those interviews.
2. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE JCPOA
2.1 Context
2.1.1. Having political will at the highest level
Political will at the highest levels is essential for progress. In the context of the JCPOA, the presidents of the two key negotiating partners, Iran and the US, were deeply committed to working out a deal and had sufficiently empowered their lead negotiators to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. For both presidents, the Iran deal was a foreign policy priority, and they were able to exercise their executive powers to overcome domestic opposition. In addition to the existence of that political will, a means to communicate the interest is required for that will to lead to dialogue. For example, it was the mutual willingness of the US and Iran to establish an authoritative communication channel (the Oman talks).[4]
Furthermore, beyond the presidential level, the US Secretary of State Kerry and the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif were given substantial authority in the process and seem to have taken the negotiations very personally. As the JCPOA experience shows, negotiations benefit from top decision-makers delegating the negotiations to leaders with sufficient authority and ownership who can make tough decisions.
The renewed talks of 2021–2022 confirm the critical role of having a political will at the highest levels. US President Biden promised to restore the JCPOA as a part of his foreign policy agenda during the election campaign and has since remained committed to it.[5] Iran's ex-president Rouhani also signalled readiness to negotiate despite the obvious mistrust caused by the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018.[6] In turn, Iran’s newly elected president Raisi announced the plan to revive the deal.[7] In general, the willingness to reach an agreement between all involved parties led to eight rounds of talks, the latest of which is still ongoing in Vienna at the time of writing.
2.1.2. Acting on emerging opportunities
Perhaps as important as political will are windows of opportunity: the parties to the Iran deal were able to take advantage of a rare confluence of factors. US President Obama's commitment coincided with the election in Iran of President Rouhani, Iran's former chief nuclear negotiator, in the early 2000s. Both were personally invested in the deal and realized that continuation of the crisis could only lead to further deterioration of the situation. Additionally, even though there were hard-liners opposing the agreement, the overall political climate in both States allowed for a window of opportunity. A sense of urgency to resolve the crisis at that particular moment was a key driver for success.
There were similar hopes about the negotiations to restore the JCPOA that started on 7 April 2021. The established Administration in Tehran and the new Administration in Washington wanted to restore compliance on day one after Biden was inaugurated.[8] However, by the time the Biden administration established itself and officially announced its readiness to take steps to return to compliance with the JCPOA in early April,[9] too little time remained before the next election in Iran. Moreover, the fact that the deal was severely polarizing in both countries further prolonged and complicated the negotiation process.[10] The new Iranian government came to power in the June 2021 election and needed time to solidify its position. As a result of the missed opportunity between January and June 2021, no final agreement has been reached as of August 2022.
2.1.3. Being mindful of domestic politics
As has already been briefly mentioned, domestic politics also played a significant role. The Obama Administration faced significant domestic opposition to a deal with Iran, particularly in Congress. Most of the Administration's political efforts were spent on convincing Democrats to overcome congressional opposition following the passage of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which required a congressional vote on a final deal.[11] Less attention was paid to opposition by Republicans, which later allowed the Trump Administration to capitalize on the resulting discontent. The JCPOA case suggests that opposition party support is vital to the success of any agreement. Ensuring such support is extremely difficult, but worthwhile, especially when the agreement is not legally binding and requires bipartisan support to survive power transitions.
2.1.4. Understanding the costs of not compromising
Incentives to negotiate existed for both sides: the E3/EU+3 saw the rapid advancement of the Iranian nuclear programme, and Iran was suffering from the increasingly onerous sanctions.[12] The costs of not compromising were becoming too high. For Iran, the tightening sanctions significantly weakened its economy and decreased trade volumes, creating the risk of further instability.[13]E3/EU+3 faced the risk of the emergence of another nuclear possessor State since Iran's nuclear capabilities had recently grown significantly, culminating in Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's adviser Kamal Kharrazi claiming that "[i]t is no secret that we have the technical capabilities to manufacture a nuclear bomb, but we have no decision to do so."[14]Such logic is valid for both the early JCPOA negotiations and the most recent talks aimed at reviving the deal. For any such deal to be lasting, clear benefits must be obtainable for both sides.
2.2. Actors
2.2.1. Ensuring unity on mutual goals
In the context of the JCPOA, it was important for the E3/EU+3 to act as a single unit and to ensure that all the parties, including Iran, had a unity of purpose. Most importantly, this purpose included the mutual goal of averting military conflict and achieving a negotiated settlement of the outstanding nuclear and sanction issues. Setting aside unilateral interests and bilateral issues between the parties was vital to keeping the negotiating momentum. On most points, not six countries negotiating independently but six unified parties who shared the same overarching goal were negotiating with Iran.
2.2.2. Communicating through intermediaries
A breakthrough in the JCPOA negotiation process happened as a result of secret negotiations in Oman and Turkey. Oman was critical for providing a direct channel between Washington and Tehran at a time when it was still difficult, if not impossible, for the two to have direct talks without mediation. Interviewees credited Oman, in particular, for facilitating the first US offer to "explore the possibility of a limited domestic enrichment programme as part of a comprehensive agreement."[15] Crucially, this also included convincing Tehran that this concession and a major policy shift by the US could be trusted.
In negotiating the JCPOA, the EU played an important coordinating and mediating role. The EU's insistence on a multilateral solution significantly lowered the risk of military escalation. It also provided continuity throughout the process, given the EU's role since the early 2000s in attempting to broker a deal between Iran, France, Germany and the UK. The European role was also essential for sustaining the JCPOA agreement since the US left the deal in 2018.[16]
In the context of a complicated multilateral negotiation, ensuring the commitment of all key stakeholders in the process is indispensable. In the case of the JCPOA, France and Germany would experience significantly stronger adverse effects from sanctions on their trade than the US, so their support was critical.
2.2.3. Building personal relationships
Personal relationships between negotiators can be powerful. There is great value in building such relationships through repeated interactions at the level of key officials, and also at the working level. In the early stages of the JCPOA talks, the negotiators were well known to each other and many of the Iranian experts had lived and studied abroad in the US or the UK. For example, this sort of relationship was true for the US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi, who had overlapped at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s and had many former classmates and colleagues in common.
The importance of the personal factor was also acknowledged during the latest rounds of the talks. Speaking about the seventh round of the renewed JCPOA negotiation, Enrique Mora, deputy secretary general of the European External Action Service, emphasized that establishing relationships with the new Iranian delegation (assigned following the June 2021 election) was the priority.[17]
2.2.4. Balancing groups of interest
China and Russia played a unique role in the negotiation of the JCPOA by offering support to Iran at particularly sensitive moments of the talks while staying committed to the goal of the broader negotiations. They also played an important role in offering their technical services during negotiations (coming up with innovative technical solutions) and during the implementation phase, such as converting the Fordow Enrichment Facility to produce stable isotopes and redesigning the Arak heavy-water reactor to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium.[18]
2.2.5. Engaging civil society
Engaging think tanks is crucial for ensuring informed debates, while civil society can also be instrumental in proposing solutions to the most challenging issues.
Throughout the JCPOA negotiations and preparations thereof, NGOs were approached by officials with requests for evidence-based analyses to enable informed decision-making. Around 2012–2013, the Arms Control Association, International Crisis Group, and a group of physicists at MIT-Princeton put together material outlining potential solutions to limiting uranium enrichment capacity and circulated them to the negotiating teams. Some of the concepts were reflected in the 2015 agreement, although it is important to note that as there are limited ways to achieve this particular technical objective, the result may not be directly attributed to their efforts. Civil society may promote ideas for the negotiators and technical teams, but it takes the officials and scientific experts on the inside to take these ideas and translate them into policy.
Various organizations in the US and Europe made great efforts to inform the public and legislatures as to why the JCPOA was the best approach to avoid WMD proliferation and potential conflict in the Middle East over the growing Iranian nuclear programme. They explained that limiting the capacity of the programme was complicated, and that the provisions included in the JCPOA made it one of the most complex and effective non-proliferation agreements. Currently, think tanks are endeavouring to dispel dis- and misinformation about the JCPOA that continues to proliferate both in public discourse and in some legislatures.[19]
2.2.6. Having a neutral third party verify implementation
It is very unlikely that the deal would have come to fruition without the IAEA's involvement.[20] The IAEA has been designated as the body to verify and monitor the implementation of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA through the United Nations Security Council resolution 2231.[21] Its involvement allowed for two parallel paths of the negotiation: technical and political.[22] The IAEA reported on Iran's compliance with the deal until 8 May 2019, when Iran's Supreme National Security Council decided to stop implementing some of the measures under the JCPOA due to US withdrawal.[23] Striving to maintain technical credibility through distancing himself from any political decisions, the IAEA Director General (DG) continued emphasising that no verification issue is ever fully closed because the IAEA conducts continuous assessments through surveillance and regular inspections. This relates to one of the rifts in the renewed JCPOA negotiation—Iran's insistence on closing the probe into four Iranian facilities. However, the IAEA is mandated to provide technical conclusions on the results of verification activities. It is then left to the negotiators to decide on any further actions on the basis of such technical conclusions.[24]
Another noteworthy feature is the current IAEA DG's new approach to dealing with safeguards and JCPOA-related issues separately. He bifurcated the reporting of the JCPOA (compliance with) and safeguards (correctness and completeness). The IAEA's technical objectivity in reporting Iran's full compliance before the US withdrawal from the deal and its commitment to resolving outstanding issues without political bias have played a balancing role. For example, the IAEA avoided making the political decision to disregard unresolved safeguards issues in order to reach a deal on the JCPOA. Continuous engagement with the IAEA by all parties, including Iran, in the most challenging circumstances clearly shows that they recognize the IAEA's technical authority. Thus, despite formally not being a part of the negotiation (rather the body responsible for verification), the IAEA also remains a communication channel for the process participants.
2.3. Format
2.3.1. Having a bilateral track within a multilateral format
For the JCPOA, the catalyst for key negotiations was bilateral interaction between the US and Iran. As described by then US Deputy Secretary of State Burns, who led the effort to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations by offering to depart from the zero-enrichment position, "the purpose of the secret bilateral talks [was] to test Iranian seriousness on the nuclear issue, and jump-start the broader P5+1 process."[25]
While it became clear in both capitals that the key concessions had to be made bilaterally, transitioning to the broader multilateral process had to occur for the deal to receive international support and to ensure its implementation. The Security Council's support was crucial for lifting international sanctions and providing a legal framework (in the form of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015)) to endorse the agreement and serve as a backstop in case of violation.
2.3.2. Negotiating at multiple levels
Whether bilateral or multilateral, the JCPOA negotiations needed to include participation at the political, technical, and legal levels. Also — at all levels — the JCPOA benefitted from multiple Track 1.5 consultations, which allowed for low-threshold signalling (e.g. sending particular messages, which can help move negotiations forward without official evidence or recognition).[27] Interviewees pointed out that having technical experts in the room during the talks was particularly useful. As some JCPOA negotiators recall, when chief negotiators were discussing political issues and came to a deadlock on technical matters, technical experts from all sides were on site to offer possible solutions. That ensured a less interrupted negotiating process. Technical experts were also engaged on a parallel track of talks where they were able to clarify differences in knowledge or understanding of technicalities.
2.4. Process
2.4.1. Signalling to the counterpart
President Obama made several public efforts to engage the President of Iran, including extending congratulations to President Rouhani upon his election and sending him multiple personal letters. Interviewees also pointed out that public signalling to convince domestic audiences of the necessity of negotiations had the additional useful side effect of demonstrating US commitment to the promises it had made to Iran. Investing substantial political capital domestically helped convince Iran that it would be worth taking the US seriously during the progression and potential conclusion of negotiations.
In the efforts to restore the JCPOA, Biden's Administration, Rouhani's, and then Raisi's governments signalled their intent — through explicit public comments — to negotiate the deal renewal.
2.4.2. Compartmentalizing issues
Establishing unity of purpose in the multilateral setting and staying focused on the core issues were critical to the JCPOA negotiation process and essential to its eventual success. The parties were able to compartmentalize their agendas and focus exclusively on Iran's nuclear programme, rather than insist on linkages to other issues, including ballistic missiles, regional matters, or any other individual political agendas that parties had during all stages of the negotiation process. The most recent complication that the talks were able to withstand was triggered by the invasion of Ukraine, which significantly affected the relations between Russia and other Western countries.[28]
2.4.3. Achieving interim baseline understandings
As noted above, the first breakthrough in the Iran negotiations came about as a result of bilateral talks between Iran and the US in Oman. They were low-profile, direct talks that allowed the parties to clarify expectations, intentions, and red lines and to reach an interim understanding. This understanding, which led to the Joint Plan of Action, laid the groundwork for successful follow-on multilateral negotiations in Geneva and Vienna by establishing a two-step framework: some nuclear activities would be frozen in exchange for limited sanctions relief. Crucially, it also came with the understanding that this exchange would be a building block for a long-term deal and that some limited enrichment would be accepted. Having preliminary "talks for talks" where parties could discuss the scope, format, and setting of future negotiations was vital for the successful conclusion of the JCPOA. In particular, it was important to broadly establish the anticipated end-state of a long-term deal.
When the first round of the JCPOA restoration negotiations began in early April 2021, the parties also clarified their baseline demands within the first weeks and created three corresponding working groups.[29]
2.4.4. Ensuring continuity
The ability to sustain the effort over time is crucial. The Obama administration's two terms in power removed time pressure so that the parties would be able to negotiate on mutually agreeable terms and make the deal comprehensive. The European positions also retained continuity since the UK, Germany, and France, in coordination with the EU, had been trying to negotiate with Iran since 2005–2006. By the time Rouhani came to power, there was also continuity in the relations with the Iranian government. This all ensured favourable conditions for the initial JCPOA agreement.[30]
2.5. Challenges
2.5.1. Addressing withdrawal and non-compliance
Assuming that only one party might not comply with the provisions of an agreement carries significant risks. As demonstrated by the case of the JCPOA, there is a need to ‘raise the cost’ of withdrawal for all parties. During the interviews conducted by the authors, several participants referred to the difficulty of agreeing on a format that could make it more difficult for a party to withdraw. Some referred to the approach of ensuring approval by the legislative body. In the case of the US, a congressional-executive agreement requiring simple majority approval by the House and Senate was suggested as a more feasible alternative given the contentious nature of Iran-related issues in the country.[31] Such an agreement would become more legally binding domestically than a mere executive agreement but would not require the full 2/3 Senate vote of a formal treaty.
As also noted by some interviewees, many US commitments were easier to reverse. At the same time, some of the actions agreed to by Iran were closer to being irreversible (e.g. modification of the Arak facility). Ultimately, a key challenge was for the two parties to agree on mutual commitments that they both deemed similarly reversible or irreversible. This seems to be the main stumbling block at the moment, with Iran demanding a US commitment not to withdraw. At the same time, it is not possible in the current framework: the deal is a non-binding political agreement, not a legally-binding treaty.[32]
2.5.2. Avoiding maximalist positions and compromising
Another key takeaway in reviewing the JCPOA negotiations is that maximalist positions do not result in sustainable agreements, and compromises are necessary on both sides. One of the key breakthroughs for the JCPOA was when the Obama Administration decided to forego the US's previous zero-enrichment stance. In 2010, when the Administration was focused primarily on additional sanctions on Iran, "negotiations would be pursued, but mostly to inquire whether the other side was ready to yield, not to engage in a proper search for a compromise. It was a race between several clocks, in which the United States needed its sanctions clock to tick faster than both Iran's nuclear clock and Israel's pressure for military action." It was a contest of resilience, determination, and perseverance.[33]
Only in Istanbul in April 2012 were the parties able to establish a process guided by the principle of a "step-by-step approach and reciprocity."[34] Talks would occur within the framework of the NPT, which Iran viewed as tantamount to accepting a right to enrich. This convinced Iran to agree to bilateral negotiations directly with the US, which, as pointed out by several interviewees, was one of Iran's main concessions.
In the renewed negotiation, compromise has helped the process to come closer to reaching the deal. One of the stumbling blocks — the removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list — has reportedly been dropped. The US is in the process of formulating a response to Iran's reply to the EU-led proposal.[35] While there seems to be progress on the issue of lifting sanctions,[36] the outstanding safeguards issues and the US withdrawal are at present seemingly harder to address.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The JCPOA experience has demonstrated that when negotiating with an adversary, sides come to the table with the recognition that there is mutual distrust and great scepticism that an agreement can be reached. However, even in the most antagonistic circumstances, it is essential to show respect for the counterpart and signal preparedness to negotiate with a shared goal in mind. The parties should act on windows of opportunity and consider domestic political realities, while the costs of not compromising should outweigh the costs of compromising. Engaging civil society can help with public signalling to the counterparts and address domestic opposition by clarifying the costs and benefits of accepting particular terms for domestic audiences. Successful negotiators seek, at the outset, to clarify and recognize where there are differences that cannot be bridged (red lines), and also the differences that have the potential for reconciliation. Real progress can then be made by focusing on areas where there is a convergence of interests, even when the overall interests between the parties diverge significantly. Thus, it is essential to come to the negotiating table with a realistic position and be ready to compromise.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper builds upon and expands the research done for the original paper prepared for the INMM/ESARDA 2021 Conference on "Applicability of the JCPOA Experience to the Korean Peninsula." [37] The authors thank everyone who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this project.
REFERENCES
[1] Preamble and General Provisions (xi.), Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Vienna, 14 July 2015, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf
[2] Suzanne DiMaggio, Dealing with North Korea: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Negotiations, Arms Control Today, July/August 2017, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-07/features/remarks-dealing-north-korea-lessons-iran-nuclear-negotiations
[3] This was confirmed to the authors by several interviewees with direct knowledge of this issue. See also: The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for Energy and Security Studies, DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead, 14 July 2021, p. 74, available at: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/07/dprk-strategic-capabilities-security-korean-peninsula
[4] Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy, Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, New Haven & London: Yale University Press (2017), p. 163
[5] Kelsey Davenport, Julia Masterson, and Sang-Min Kim, Raisi Pledges Return to Nuclear Talks, Arms Control Association, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2021-08/p4-1-iran-nuclear-deal-alert
[6] Julia Masterson, Iran, U.S. Take Steps Toward Restoring Nuclear Deal, Arms Control Association, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-05/news/iran-us-take-steps-toward-restoring-nuclear-deal
[7] Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Iran Ready To Resume Talks On Nuclear Deal, But Not Under Western 'Pressure,' Raisi Says, available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-nuclear-raisi-jcpoa-negotiations-us/31443879.html
[8] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[9] Julia Masterson, Iran, U.S. Take Steps Toward Restoring Nuclear Deal, Arms Control Association, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-05/news/iran-us-take-steps-toward-restoring-nuclear-deal
[10] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[11] Ben Rhodes, The World As It Is, A Memoir of the Obama White House, New York: Random House (2018), p. 328
[12] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[13] Abigail Ng, These 6 Charts Show How Sanctions Are Crushing Iran’s Economy, CNBC, available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html
[14] Maryam Sinaee, Khamenei Adviser Says Iran Has Not Opted For Nukes But Has Capability, Iran International, available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202207176618
[15] William J. Burns, The Back Channel, New York: Random House (2019), p. 361
[16] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[17] Xinhua, 7th Round of Iran Nuclear Talks Concludes in Vienna, available at: http://www.news.cn/english/2021-12/18/c_1310379769.htm
[18] Fars News Agency, AEOI Chief: China Helping Iran Redesign Arak Reactor, 10 February 2016, available at: https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/13941121000954/en/Arcive
[19] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[20] Laura Rockwood, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Veronika Bedenko and Valeriia Hesse, 12 August 2022
[21] Resolution 2231 (2015), S/RES/2231 (2015), United Nations Security Council, 20 July 2015
[22] Laura Rockwood, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Veronika Bedenko and Valeriia Hesse, 12 August 2022
[23] Aabha Dixit, Important for Iran to Implement its JCPOA Commitments, IAEA Director General Says, IAEA, available at: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/important-for-iran-to-implement-its-jcpoa-commitments-iaea-director-general-says
[24] IAEA, Joint Statement by HE Mr Mohammad Eslami, Vice-President and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and HE Mr Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, available at: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/joint-statement-by-he-mr-mohammad-eslami-vice-president-and-president-of-the-atomic-energy-organization-of-iran-and-he-mr-rafael-grossi-director-general-of-the-international-atomic-energy-agency
[25] William J. Burns, The Back Channel, New York: Random House (2019), p. 361
[26] NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, IAEA, GOV/2022/26, 30 May 2022
[27] Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, U.S.-Iran Thaw Grew From Years of Behind-the-Scenes Talks, The Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2013, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579181710805094376; Daniel Wertz, Track II Diplomacy with Iran and North Korea, Lessons Learned from Unofficial Talks with Nuclear Outliers, The National Committee on North Korea, June 2017, available at: https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/NCNK_Track_II_Conference_Report_0.pdf; Suzanne DiMaggio, Track II Diplomacy, in The Iran Primer: Power, Politics and U.S. Policy edited by Robin B. Wright, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010, p. 206-208
[28] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[29] Julia Masterson, Iran, U.S. Take Steps Toward Restoring Nuclear Deal, Arms Control Association, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-05/news/iran-us-take-steps-toward-restoring-nuclear-deal
[30] Daryl Kimbal, Reflections on the JCPOA Negotiations, Interview by Valeriia Hesse, 5 August 2022
[31] Robert Einhorn, Richard Nephew, Constraining Iran’s Future Nuclear Capabilities, March 2019, Brookings Institute, p. 10, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190321_nuclear_capabilities_WEB.pdf
[32] Reuters, Factbox: The Three Major Issues Bedevilling Talks on Reviving Iran Nuclear Deal, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-major-issues-bedevilling-talks-reviving-iran-nuclear-deal-2022-08-15/
[33] Trita Parsi, Losing an Enemy, Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, New Haven & London: Yale University Press (2017), p. 123
[34] BBC, Iran nuclear talks in Istanbul ‘constructive’, 15 April 2012, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17716241; Laura Rozen, How Iran Talks Were Saved From Verge of Collapse, Al-Monitor, 16 April 2012, available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2012/al-monitor/exclusive-how-iran-talks-came-ba.html; Aslı Ü. Bâli, Iran Will Require Assurances: An Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Research and Information Project, 18 May 2012, available at: https://merip.org/2012/05/iran-will-require-assurances/
[35] Al Jazeera, US Says ‘Encouraged’ by Iranian Response to Nuclear Deal Proposal, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/us-says-encouraged-by-iranian-response-to-nuclear-deal-proposal
[36] Maziar Motamedi, Are Iran and the West About to Finally Agree a Nuclear Deal?, Al Jazeera, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/20/are-iran-west-about-finally-agree-nuclear-deal-explainer
[37] Jaewoo Shin, Veronika Bedenko, Laura Rockwood, Applicability of the JCPOA Experience to the Korean Peninsula Crisis Resolution, proceedings of the INMM & ESARDA Joint Virtual Annual Meeting, August 23-26 & August 30-September 1, 202
