US Election Outcome Unlikely to have Significant Impact on the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme

On 5 November 2024, Donald Trump was re-elected in the 2024 US presidential election after spending a term out of office following a loss to President Joe Biden in 2020. Trump’s first term had uprooted many of the US’ long-held foreign policy priorities and revealed a more transactional approach to negotiations with foreign heads of state. Most of the world had been anxiously awaiting the results of the US election, as it is expected to have far-reaching implications for global affairs.

Among these is Trump’s approach to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). His first term in office began with incendiary exchanges with Kim Jong Un, and the DPRK’s last nuclear test in 2017. However, by the end of Trump’s term, he and Kim had met for three rounds of summit talks. Of these, the Hanoi summit in 2019 was the most substantial attempt to reconcile respective US and DPRK demands for denuclearisation and sanctions relief. These nuclear talks in 2019 followed a legacy of US-DPRK negotiations stretching back to the Agreed Framework (1994-2002) and Six Party Talks (2003-2008). Trump and Kim met once more after Hanoi; however, there were no signs of progress in negotiation and the DPRK did not respond to a subsequent offer by the Biden administration to revisit talks. In general, negotiations with the DPRK were a relatively low priority for the Biden administration.

Forecasting workshop on the DPRK’s nuclear programme

In February 2024, a workshop was held[1] across two days by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), Open Nuclear Network (ONN) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)[2], facilitated by the Swift Centre.[3] The workshop used expert elicitation and forecasting methods to educe and develop potential future scenarios involving the DPRK’s nuclear programme, with a focus on drawing implications for production of weapons-usable nuclear material and delivery systems, and exploring verification options for any future negotiated deal based on these scenarios.

Areas of external influence potentially affecting the DPRK’s future nuclear arsenal were identified and analysed by workshop participants.[4] While a more comprehensive report will be published in coming weeks that includes information on all drivers and scenarios analysed during the workshop, of particular present relevance was the exploration of how nuclear negotiations with the US could affect the DPRK’s future nuclear programme, including assessing what impacts the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election could have.

Effect of US election on DPRK nuclear negotiations, arsenal

Forecasting performed by the convened experts found it possible but not likely that the DPRK would once again participate in negotiations with the US and leverage its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip. It was noted that past nuclear negotiations have often failed for reasons outside of the nuclear realm, with the US seemingly unable to compromise on topics such as human rights and the DPRK categorically refusing to discuss the topic. Experts further noted that the likelihood of successful negotiations has decreased further since the 2019 nuclear talks. The US continues to insist on denuclearisation as a goal for any negotiations, while the DPRK has made definitive moves since the last round of negotiations in the opposite direction, codifying the permanence of its nuclear policy in its 2023 constitutional amendment and demonstrating that the programme has become an inseparable part of the state’s defence. In sum, while DPRK denuclearisation as a goal seems to be a requirement for the US to participate in negotiations, it is now a non-starter for the DPRK.

The workshop participants explored this issue further in a series of forecasting questions imagining a future with Trump re-elected as US President in November 2024, versus a future where a non-Trump president is elected, with a general agreement that the DPRK policies of a Democrat-led Administration would be similar and therefore result in similar outcomes.

While the workshop participants estimated a roughly 30% likelihood that nuclear negotiations would occur within the next five years under a future Trump Administration, they assessed that the overall impact of the US presidential election on the total forecasted DPRK nuclear warhead stockpile in 2029 would be small. Despite the outcome of the US election, the participants concluded that the DPRK would remain unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations aimed at halting fissile material production, reducing its nuclear arsenal or disarming altogether.

While it was assessed that Kim Jong Un would be reluctant to meaningfully engage with Trump again partly due to political risks – “Trump couldn't deliver before” – workshop participants assessed that there would be a slightly higher potential for talks between Trump and Kim than the non-Trump alternative due to their mutual affinity for high-profile meetings and previous exchanges. While there have been some indications since the workshop that the DPRK may be interested in re-opening nuclear talks with Trump, to include comments from a former high-level diplomat who recently defected to Cuba,[5] such potential discussions were noted by participants as unlikely to yield substantial outcomes, especially considering the significant changes the DPRK has made over the past few years to solidify its nuclear programme.

Overall, regardless of the outcome of the US election, significant concessions would be required from the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the US to elicit any willingness to negotiate from the DPRK; even then, the feasibility of achieving agreement on substantial arms control or denuclearisation in the current and worsening geopolitical climate remains doubtful. The maximum concession foreseen could be a cap on warhead numbers or a nuclear test moratorium, which could keep the DPRK from a performing a seventh nuclear test, for which ONN analysts have assessed it could be prepared.[6]

In the end, under the Trump forecast scenario, only a slight weapons production slowdown was forecasted, resulting in less than 5% fewer nuclear warheads than the baseline. Under a non-Trump future, it was forecasted that there would be a negligible difference from the baseline.

Hence, the outcome of the 2024 US election was assessed as unlikely to change the future of the DPRK nuclear arsenal; if negotiations do occur, they would likely lead to a pause in DPRK activities at most, but not a rollback. The DPRK may even push for recognition as a nuclear power. Moreover, given past negotiations failures, the DPRK was seen as unlikely to agree to cease any activities critical to nuclear weapons production during negotiations, only after such a time that an agreement is reached. Finally, it was noted that the DPRK would only easily give up something it thinks it does not need – any concessions that it would offer without much in return could therefore be understood as of relative unimportance to the nuclear programme.