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The Return of the IRBM: Technical Insights and INF Moratorium Implications of Russia's Oreshnik Missile Launch

Nikita Degtyarev

6 December 2024

The views expressed in this post are those of the author and not necessarily those of Open Nuclear Network or any other agency, institution, or partner.

What happened? 

On 21 November, Russia launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) named Oreshnik (Hazel) from the Astrakhan region, targeting Ukraine’s Pivdenmash (formerly, Yuzhmash) industrial enterprise in the city of Dnipro. Once a Soviet-era missile manufacturing centre, Yuzhmash continues to produce armaments, according to Russian sources. Thirty minutes before the strike, Russia notified the US via the National Centre for Nuclear Threat Reduction. This IRBM launch can be seen as another demonstration of Russia’s readiness for further escalation if deemed necessary.

On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin went public to confirm the attack, linking the IRBM's use to recent long-range strikes with Western missiles on Russian territory. He stated that the conflict in Ukraine “assumed elements of a global nature” and warned of potential future IRBM “tests” against perceived security threats to Russia, including “countries that allow to use their weapons against” Russia’s facilities.

Notably, Russia intends to notify civilian populations in advance of future Oreshnik strikes. Later, Putin revealed that Oreshnik is already stockpiled, with similar systems under testing and slated for production. The President ordered the decision to develop the new system in July 2023 based on the “Oreshnik R&D programme.”

Oreshnik: technical characteristics

Based on currently available information and its analysis, we can extract the following technical details. It is important to note that the information presented below is speculative due to the lack of sufficient publicly available information about the new system.[1]

Missile Specifications

  • Type: Mobile, ground-based, intermediate-range ballistic missile.
  • Warheads: Carries several hypersonic, non-nuclear warheads. The missile tested on 21 November carried six warheads, each with six submunitions, though a nuclear configuration cannot be ruled out.
  • Defence Countermeasures: Possibly equipped with countermeasures to defeat missile defence systems.
  • Speed: Warheads attack targets at hypersonic speeds, reaching up to Mach 10-11 during the terminal phase.
  • Range: Estimated between 800 (below the upper limit of 1,000 km for SRBMs) to 5,800 km or beyond (above the lower limit of 5,500 km for ICBMs), depending on payload options and flight profiles. The cost-effectiveness of using such a relatively large missile to strike nearby targets may be questionable.

Potential Targets and Use Scenario

  • Standalone Fortified Targets: Military facilities or decision-making centres.
  • Wide-Area Objectives: Large defence industry enterprises.
  • Operational Use: Potential scenarios involve launching the missile "en masse and in combination with other long-range precision systems."

Development Origins

The new IRBM is highly likely based on RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which was first tested in 2011 but had its development mothballed in 2018. However, other theories about the missile should not be excluded. Oreshnik could be a shorter-range variant of Topol-M, Yars, or Kedr (Cedar) ICBMs. After all, Rubezh ICBM was built based on the Topol/Yars family ICBMs. Historically, Soviet/Russian solid-propellant missile development since the 1960s shows trends of creating MRBMs/IRBMs using different stages of ICBMs. One can see an established parallel development path. For instance:

  • RT-2 ICBM: Used in developing the RT-25 IRBM and RT-15 MRBM projects.
  • RS-14 ICBM: First and second stages were used as a basis for RSD-10 Pioneer IRBM.

Payload Uncertainties

  • Type: it remains unclear whether the warheads are hypersonic glide vehicles, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or just multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs).
  • Similarities: The warheads could share features with the Kinzhal or Avangard systems.
  • Development Institute: Since the missile system was likely developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT), some experts suggest that the warhead could be the Anchar hypersonic vehicle, a project MIT has been working on for several years.

Oreshnik and the INF moratorium

The test of Russia’s IRBM raises questions about its self-imposed INF moratorium.[2] While the moratorium officially remains in place, it appears to be eroding due to Russia’s actions amidst escalating global security tensions and mutual signalling between Russia and NATO, Russia and Ukraine. Development, production, testing, and even possible limited deployment of the INF-range missiles seem no longer constrained by the voluntary moratorium.

Erosion of the Moratorium

  • May 2023: Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced plans to accelerate the development and production of INF-range missiles in response to US actions, stating deployment would occur only if the US took similar steps.
  • June 2023: President Putin emphasised the need to begin missile production, with deployment decisions based on the actual security situation.
  • July 2023: Production preparations were confirmed, stressing the moratorium would remain as long as the US did not deploy similar systems elsewhere.
  • October 2023: A Russian representative at the UN reminded that Russia would be compelled to respond if the US deployed ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles threatening Russia

Recent Developments

In November, Putin stressed that the strike with the Oreshnik missile system was a test "in field condition,"[3] stating that the tests would be continued. The “serial production of the Oreshnik missile system has already been launched.” Moreover, other intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are being tested in Russia and, based on test results, “will also go into production.” Russia asserts that it is developing these missiles in response to US plans to produce and deploy INF systems and NATO’s “aggressive actions against Russia.” The deployment of Russia’s new INF missiles will depend on the actions of NATO countries.

Statements from Military Leadership

The Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Sergei Karakayev, added that “it seems reasonable to adopt the complex [Oreshnik] into service, continue its deployment, improve its capabilities, and to refine the operational skills of personnel when using and maintaining it.” Putin responded, “We will do just that.” This may suggest the possibility of limited deployment without waiting for corresponding US action.

Influencing Factors

Two main elements influence the situation surrounding the moratorium:

  • The Ukraine conflict and Western decisions that Russia views as threats to its security.
  • US INF missile development and future deployment in Europe and Asia.

With these factors unlikely to improve, the end of the Russian moratorium and official announcement about it seems increasingly probable.

In a Nutshell

The Oreshnik missile system is a mobile, ground-based IRBM carrying multiple warheads, and is likely based on the RS-26 Rubezh ICBM or related systems like Topol-M and Yars. It reflects a tradition in Russian missile development of adapting ICBM technology for shorter ranges. The type of payload remains unclear. It is plausible that we may witness the deployment of Russian and NATO MRBMs/IRBMs in Europe and Asia (either in limited or large numbers), which can provoke an arms race and further strategic instability. Eventually – most likely after the conflict in Ukraine has concluded – it could lead to more focused discussions between Russia and the US (and possibly NATO) regarding a new moratorium on the deployment of INF-range missiles. 


The author would like to express his gratitude to Tianran Xu for his valuable expertise, which enhanced the quality of this article.


Nikita Degtyarev is a Research Assistant for Open Nuclear Network, where he works on the testing of tools for open-source data analysis and supports ONN’s nuclear programmes research. His research interests include nuclear risk reduction, nuclear non-proliferation, Russian and NATO nuclear policy. Prior to joining ONN, Nikita was an Information & Publications Programme Coordinator at the PIR Center, where he wrote and edited papers related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control. He also produced the e-journal Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) and managed the organisation's website and social media accounts. During his master's degree studies, Nikita interned at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, conducting research on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements and long-range conventional missiles in Europe. He also interned at the Representative Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Nikita received his bachelor's degree in International Relations from Ural Federal University in Yekaterinburg, Russia. He is a graduate of the dual degree master's programme at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS) and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), majoring in global security, nuclear policy and WMD non-proliferation. 
 
Contact: ndegtyarev@paxsapiens.org

Endnotes

[1] Some related articles: ‘Decision-Making Centers in Kiev Could Be Targeted in Oreshnik Strikes — Putin’. 2024. TASS. 28 November 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1879043; ‘Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh Holds a Press Briefing’. 2024. U.S. Department of Defense. 21 November 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3975265/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FTranscripts%2FTranscript%2FArticle%2F3975265%2Fdeputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing%2F; ‘Meeting with the Defence Ministry Leadership, Representatives of the Military-Industrial Complex and Missile System Developers’. 2024. President of Russia. 22 November 2024. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75623; Ministry of Defence [@DefenceHQ]. 2024. ‘Latest Defence Intelligence Update on the Situation in Ukraine - 29 November 2024. Find out More about Defence Intelligence’s Use of Language: Https://Ow.Ly/qAlU50UhUKQ Https://T.Co/AbD4ZNk53a’. Tweet. Twitter. https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1862441700213367145; Reuters. 2024. ‘Russian Missile Reached Speed of More than 8,000 Miles per Hour, Ukraine Says’, 22 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-new-missile-fired-by-russia-flew-15-minutes-faster-than-mach-11-2024-11-22/; ‘RS-26 Rubezh’. 2024. Missile Threat. 23 April 2024. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-x-31-rs-26-rubezh/; ‘Statement by the President of the Russian Federation’. 2024. President of Russia. 22 November 2024. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75614.

[2] Putin first proposed the idea of a moratorium on the deployment of missiles previously banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019. Since then, references to this idea and a self-imposed moratorium have emerged in subsequent years.

[3] The more accurate translation of Russian “в боевых условиях” would be “in combat condition(s).” Interestingly, the Kremlin's official translation uses “in field condition” instead.

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