Taiwan's Air and Missile Defence. Part 4: Long-range SAMs versus PLA offensive capabilities

Taiwan’s Conventional Defence Series: Introduction

A major armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait would cause significant disruptions to the global economy and have serious geopolitical consequences. Despite persistent calls for Taiwan to enhance its asymmetrical warfare capabilities, information on Taiwan’s defence capabilities has often been outdated and incomplete. Additionally, Taiwan’s conventional deterrence is frequently overlooked in discussions of its security, particularly in the broader context of China-US relations.

This series aims to provide a clearer understanding of Taiwan’s defence capabilities and contribute to the discourse on defence and the wider geopolitical issues surrounding Taiwan. It begins by exploring Taiwan's core defence capabilities, such as air defence, sea control, counter-strike and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). The series will then examine the development and outlook for Taiwan’s main military branches, followed by discussions on other relevant topics, including military exercises, defence spending, recruitment, and arms development and procurement.

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Long-range Air and Ballistic Missile Defence

SAMs versus PLA offensive capabilities

The previous three articles examined Taiwan’s^[1] long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. This article attempts to provide a rough assessment on Taiwan’s overall long-range air defence capabilities vis-à-vis relevant PLA offensive capabilities.

1. Summary: Taiwan’s long-range air and missile defence

As described in previous articles, Taiwan’s Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command currently operates nine PAC-2/3 batteries and 12 Tien Kung-2/3 batteries. The command is expected to receive more advanced missile interceptors in the future (Table 1).

Table 1. Current and future SAM systems of Taiwan’s Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command.

The 21 advanced long-range SAM batteries provided extremely dense and overlapping air and missile defence coverage (Figure 1). To offer a rough reference, the current long-range SAM coverage is approximately 36 times as dense as Western supplied long-range SAM coverage over Ukrainian-controlled territories as of April 2025.^[3]Figure 1. Projected long-range SAM coverage of Taiwan in 2026. Image: Google Earth

2. Long-range SAMs versus PLA offensive capabilities:

Among the long-range SAMs operated by Taiwan’s Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command, approximately 380 PAC-3 CRI missiles have dedicated and proven anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capabilities. In contrast, other missile types currently in service (PAC-2 GEM, Tien Kung-2, and Tien Kung-3) are primarily anti-aircraft systems with varying but generally lower effectiveness against ballistic missiles. Additional PAC-3 MSE interceptors are also expected to arrive by 2026, though the exact number remains unclear.

Long-range SAMs are also capable of engaging targets such as OWA (One Way Attack) drones and subsonic ground-attack cruise missiles.^[4] However, intercepting these relatively “easier” targets would accelerate the depletion of long-range missile stockpiles. Ideally, advanced long-range SAMs should be reserved for countering incoming ballistic missiles and, when possible, manned and large, unmanned aircraft, while simpler threats — such as drones and subsonic cruise missiles — are handled by shorter-range SAM systems or other countermeasures.

a. PLA ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan

In the event of a cross-Strait war, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) will be the primary type of ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.^[5] According to the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress, as of 2024, the PLA operates approximately 900 ground-launched SRBMs. When factoring in (1) China’s bomber fleet armed with air-launched ballistic missiles, (2) penetration aids and manoeuvrability of PLA ballistic missiles, and (3) typical practice to shoot more than one interceptors against an incoming ballistic target, Taiwan’s existing interceptors alone are insufficient to fully protect Taiwan from PLA ballistic missile strikes (Table 2).

The PLA’s PCH-191 multiple rocket launchers (Figure 2), an emerging threat^[6] that can target the main island of Taiwan from across the Strait, further complicates Taiwan’s ballistic missile defence. While these large rockets lack manoeuvrability and penetration aids, their relatively low cost and large quantity could potentially accelerate the depletion of Taiwan's missile interceptors (Table 2).

Table 2. PLA ballistic missile threats versus Taiwan’s interceptors. Source for PLA assets: US DoD

Figure 2. PCH-191 MRL could strike the whole of Taiwan from across the Strait with up to eight 370 mm guided rockets. Image: CCTV/Sina

b. High value aircraft

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that near-peer militaries face significant challenges in achieving air superiority over enemy territory. Given Taiwan’s dense long-range SAM coverage and relatively sizable fighter jet fleet, PLA aircraft are likely to rely on stand-off munitions launched from beyond the reach of Taiwan’s air defences until those defences are sufficiently degraded. Valuable, large unmanned surveillance drones are also unlikely to venture into highly contested airspace. This means that Taiwan’s long-range SAMs are unlikely to score numerous kills against manned and large, unmanned aircraft. However, as discussed in a previous article, a sufficient quantity of long-range SAMs is crucial for hindering and disrupting enemy air strikes, especially as attack aircraft increasingly rely on guided glide bombs when more sophisticated airborne stand-off ground attack munitions run low.

Table 3. PLA’s manned aircraft in Eastern and Southern Theatre Command versus Taiwan’s long-range SAMs. PLA aircraft under other theatre commands are also highly likely to engage in hostilities. Source for PLA assets: US DoD

A situation of competing priorities could potentially put more strain on the PAC-2 GEM and Tien Kung-3 stock: On the one hand, a sufficient number of these missiles are needed to deter attacks from aircraft.^[10] On the other hand, they will also be used to intercept incoming ballistic targets, though at a lower success rate compared to the PAC-3 variants.

3. Conclusion

Based on simplified numerical comparisons (Table 2 and Table 3), and also given that (1) long-range SAMs are likely to be consumed at a higher-than-ideal rate due to engagement with lower-value targets, (2) air defence assets would become targets of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) operations, and (3) medium-range ballistic missiles (1000 to 3000 km range) may be used against Taiwan, it is clear that interceptors alone cannot fully protect Taiwan from PLA air strikes. This situation almost certainly requires Taiwan to adopt a three-pronged approach, rather than relying solely on air defence systems:

• Active defence: Optimising and cost-effectively distributing firepower is crucial to sustaining an active defence. Taiwan’s long-range SAMs should be reserved for engaging high-value targets, such as ballistic missiles, manned and large, unmanned aircraft. Whenever possible, lower-value and slower targets, including subsonic ground-attack munitions, loitering munitions, OWA drones and guided bombs, should be countered with less expensive air defence measures, such as shorter-range systems and electronic warfare equipment. 
• Passive defence: As argued above, a significant number of ballistic missiles and other ground-attack munitions will inevitably penetrate Taiwan’s defences. Therefore, passive defensive measures, such as preventing attacks, taking the hits, and limiting damage, is as crucial as active defence. These measures include camouflage, concealment, deception, fortification of key assets, and timely repair of damages.
• Counter-strike: The most cost-effective way to counter air strikes, especially when facing emerging ground-attack weapons like large-caliber multiple rocket launchers, loitering munitions and OWA drones, is to destroy launch platforms and key logistic hubs supporting these systems using a “shoot the archer, not the arrow” approach.

To successfully implement this three-pronged approach, advanced and numerous SAM systems are not the only prerequisite. Other prerequisites include a distributed network of passive and active sensors, especially those that could better counter stealth targets, resilient C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and effective counter-strike capabilities. These aspects will be covered in future articles.

4. Outlooks

Assuming a relatively soft budget constraints in the coming years, Taiwan’s Air Force Air Defense and Missile Command might take the following steps to further strengthen its long-range air and missile defence:

• Purchasing and taking delivery of PAC-3 MSE missiles: Reportedly, the fund spared from Taiwan’s reduced purchase of PAC-3 CRI (from 444 down to 386) would be enough to buy 58 PAC-3 MSE rounds, while the US proposed in 2022 to sell 100 PAC-3 MSE rounds. The Liberty Times reported that the number of the MSE variant might eventually reach several hundreds. However, this figure most certainly exceeds the current available funds and would require new purchases.
• Purchasing more PAC-2 GEM variants: As discussed in a previous article, there are effectively no reloads for the PAC-2 GEM missiles (assuming each Patriot battery is equipped with the same number of missiles and launchers). Taiwan might capitalise on the recent surge of production of PAC-2 GEM variants to reduce its procurement cost. Additional PAC-2 GEMs will increase the Patriot batteries’ flexibility and resilience.
• Initiating mass production of the enhanced Tien Kung-3/Tien Kung-4 missiles: With an interception altitude higher than the PAC-3 variants, the Tien Kung-4 is expected to form the first layer of ballistic missile defence over Taiwan. The introduction of Tien Kung-4 and PAC-3 MSE will further enhance Taiwan’s capability to intercept ballistic missiles.
• Enhancing the protection of air defence assets: This effort would involve (1) fortifying and protecting SAM sites, including storage and maintenance facilities, (2) using concealment, camouflage, and advanced decoys, and (3) ensuring robust training and management of pre-surveyed sites for mobile deployment.
• Building counter-strike capabilities with other branches of the armed forces: A significant portion of Taiwan’s long-range ground-attack weapons is operated by the Air Force Air Defence and Missile Command. Taiwan’s efforts to develop counter-attack capabilities will be discussed in future articles.
• Improving interoperability with US supplied equipment: Reportedly, the Tien Kung SAMs could only indirectly receive target acquisition data from the US supplied AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS long-range early warning radar, and the domestically developed mobile AESA radar would eventually form an integrated kill-chain with the Tien Kung SAMs. It remains to be seen whether the US and Taiwanese governments can reach an agreement on compatibility issues.

Appendix: Estimated quantity of Tien Kung-2 and Tien Kung-3 missiles

The number of Tien Kung-2 and Tien Kung-3 missiles is classified. The estimates are based on the following data points:

• According to a report submitted to the Legislative Yuan, after the completion of production facility expansion in June 2022, the top production rate of Tien Kung-3 was expected to increase from 48 to 96 per year.
• As the Tien Kung-2 and Tien Kung-3 are identical in many regards, it is reasonable to assume that these two types of missiles shared the same production lines. Thus, the top production rate of Tien Kung-2 could also be estimated at 48 per year. However, it is unlikely that the production of Tien Kung-2 reached this top production rate in most of the years.
• Top production rate also does not reflect the planned nor the actual annual production number. For example, the Ministry of National Defence once revealed that only 23 Tien Kung-3 missiles were originally scheduled to be delivered in 2021, a target that was already met by late March that year. The low quota of 23 missiles per year set for 2021 might be a result of the aforementioned capacity expansion project, which might disrupt existing production lines.
• The Tien Kung-3’s production run was originally scheduled from 2015 to 2024, and was eventually extended to 2026. According to the planned budget, most of the production was carried out from 2016 to 2025.

If (1) using the planned 23 missiles per year quota in 2021 as a low-end scenario for every Tien Kung-2 production year, and (2) using the top production rate of 48 missiles per year as a high-end scenario, and (3) assuming the production of Tien Kung-2 lasted from 1997 all the way to 2014 (the year before the Tien Kung-3 enters production), the estimated number of Tien Kung-2 is:

Table 4. Low- and high-end estimates for the production of Tien Kung-2 missiles.

Further taking into account that (1) a total of 432 Tien Kung-2 silos were constructed, and (2) fluctuation was certainly to happen during the production years, it is likely that enough Tien Kung-2 missiles had been produced to arm all the 432 silos. An unknown number of reloads may exist, but most likely the number of reloads is significantly lower than the number of silos.

Similarly, if using the (1) 23 missiles per year quota for 2021 and 48 missiles per year as low-end and high-end scenarios for every Tien Kung-3 production year before 2022, and (2) using the top production rate of 96 missiles per year as the production quota after 2022, the estimated number of Tien Kung-2 missiles being produced are:

Table 5. Low-end and high-end estimate for the production of Tien Kung-3 missiles. *The quota of 23 per year for 2021 was already met by late March 2021, indicating that the actual number of Tien Kung-3 production in 2021 was most likely higher, possibly close to the 48 per year top production rate (before the production expansion). **Figures for year 2022 assume that the production rate was at 48 per year in the first half year and at 96 per year in the second half year (after production capacity expansion).

Also taking into account fluctuation in production, and the number of mobile launchers in a Tien Kung-2/3 battery, it is likely that at least 400 Tien Kung-3 missiles will be delivered by 2026 to form a roughly 1:1 ratio with the Tien Kung-2 missiles.^[11]

 

Acknowledgement: the author would like to thank Matt (Twitter handle @Lorenzo65278848), a long-time OSINT researcher in the subject matter, for his valuable feedback and review.