Long-Range, Short-Sighted: The Implications of Authorising ATACMS Strikes in Russia

The United States' (US) recent decision to authorise Ukraine's use of longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) for strikes within Russian territory is highly unlikely to yield strategic battlefield gains for Kyiv. Instead, the move will heighten tensions with Moscow, complicating prospects for ceasefire negotiations and contributing to broader geopolitical instability.

Since the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, the West has pursued a strategy of incremental qualitative increases in the weapons systems provided to Ukraine. This approach aimed to bolster Ukraine’s defences while mitigating escalation risks, particularly the potential use of nuclear weapons. Although President Putin has now approved changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, loosening the conditions under which it might employ nuclear weapons,[1] the likelihood of nuclear escalation (such as through tactical nuclear weapon use on the battlefield or a nuclear weapons test) remains remote. Such actions would carry significant diplomatic and strategic costs for Moscow, particularly with key partners like China and India.

Image: BBC

From grey zones to red lines

Russia currently lacks the military capacity to respond to this US authorisation with significant vertical escalation, such as large-scale conventional operations or strikes within Ukraine. Instead, horizontal escalation, through geographic expansion of grey zone activities, is highly likely. Moscow’s war in Ukraine has already triggered a surge of aggression, subversion, and interference, particularly within Europe. These operations, ranging from arson attacks to assassination plots and bombings, are likely to intensify. While Moscow will attempt to continue operating below the threshold of triggering direct confrontation with NATO, its growing risk appetite raises the prospect of unintended escalation.

Beyond Europe, Russia will likely also ramp up efforts to disrupt Western activities. Moscow is already working to actively undermine Western influence in several African nations and may increase these economic and military partnerships to expand its reach.[2] Russia is also considering supplying the Houthi rebels, who have targeted shipping in the Red Sea, with advanced missile systems, intelligence, and satellite-derived targeting data.[3] Providing this support would increase threats to international shipping and Western troops stationed in the region. This strategy is not without risks for Moscow, as Saudi Arabia, a key regional partner, opposes the arming of the Houthis with more advanced weapons.[4] However, Russia may calculate that the potential strategic gains now outweigh the diplomatic costs of frustrating Riyadh.

No silver bullet

ATACMS may slow Russian advances but will not shift the overall balance of the conflict in Ukraine's favour. Kyiv has long pushed for the ability to use ATACMS to strike Russian territory, viewing these weapons as essential for targeting key logistics hubs, airfields, and ammunition depots previously out of reach. While this capability will complicate Moscow’s efforts to recapture Ukrainian-held territory in the Kursk region, Russia has already taken steps to mitigate the threat by camouflaging, dispersing, and relocating its military assets outside of the ATACMS up to 300-kilometre range.[5]

Image: CNN

The Biden administration's decision, made nearly 1,000 days into the conflict,[6] is likely in response to an influx of North Korean troops on the battlefield and as an effort to position Ukraine more favourably for future negotiations under the incoming Trump administration.[7] Yet, the authorisation of US ATACMS strikes within Russia is likely to prove a strategic misstep. While these weapons may slightly increase Kyiv’s negotiating leverage if they assist in Ukraine’s retention of the Kursk salient, they will complicate diplomatic efforts, possibly prolonging the war which will only serve to bolster Russia's position. With the conflict's momentum currently favouring Russia, this escalation seems more likely to weaken Ukraine’s long-term prospects while damaging Western global interests, rather than assisting Ukraine.

Elusive Endgame

The West lacks a coherent endgame strategy for the war in Ukraine.[8] Until a clear objective is articulated, decisions that antagonise Russia without materially improving Ukraine’s position will likely continue. Given Russia’s proximity, influence, and entrenched role on the European continent, permanent isolation remains unrealistic. However, the authorisation of ATACMS strikes inside Russia will deepen hostilities between Moscow and Washington, leaving an increasingly divided European Union to grapple with economic disruptions, security risks and a shifting geopolitical landscape long after the fighting has subsided.