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President Vladimir Putin's recent announcement on 25 September about impending updates to Russia's nuclear doctrine signals a shift in the nation's strategic posture. This development prompts a critical examination of how Russia's stance on nuclear weapons has evolved over the past three decades. By revisiting official documents on foreign policy and security from the 1990s to the present, we can trace the transformation of Russia's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its defence strategy and the conditions for their use.
This analysis divides the evolution of Russia's nuclear doctrine into decades for clarity, exploring how the conditions for nuclear weapon use have changed and what this means for global security.
The 1990s: Post-Soviet Deterrence
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia's Main Provisions of the 1993 Military Doctrine emphasised nuclear weapons as tools for "eliminating the threat of nuclear war by deterring aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies."[1] In one form or another, the narrative of deterring or preventing aggression and the defensive nature of nuclear weapons has always been maintained, although the specific conditions for the use of such weapons have changed over time.
Russia pledged not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), except in cases where:
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An armed attack by such a state, allied with a nuclear-armed state, targets Russia, its territories, armed forces or allies.
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Joint actions by such a state with a nuclear-armed state involve or support an invasion or armed attack against Russia or its allies.
The 1997 National Security Concept expanded on this by reserving the right to use “all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the outbreak of armed aggression poses a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.”
The 2000s: Broadening the Scope
The 2000 Military Doctrine introduced conditions under which Russia might use nuclear weapons:
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In response to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction used against Russia and/or its allies.
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In response to large-scale aggression with conventional weapons in situations critical to Russia's national security.
Russia reiterated its commitment not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the NPT, with exceptions mirroring those outlined in the Basic Provisions from 1993.
The 2001 Military Doctrine of the Union State of Russia and Belarus further stated that Russia’s nuclear weapons could be used “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against them [Russia and Belarus], as well as in response to large-scale aggression using conventional weapons in critical situations for the security of any of the participating states.” The ambiguous term "critical situations" in both doctrines suggested a potentially lowered threshold for nuclear weapons use.
The 2010s: Raising the Threshold
The 2010 Military Doctrine raised the nuclear threshold, stating that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons:
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In response to nuclear or other WMD attacks against Russia and/or its allies.
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In the event of aggression with conventional weapons when the state’s very existence is in jeopardy.
This shift from "critical situations" to threats against the state's existence raised the nuclear threshold, narrowing the scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be employed. However, this adjustment created inconsistency with earlier commitment, regarding the defence of Belarus under the Union State doctrine. The 2014 Military Doctrine repeated the thesis from the 2010 doctrine.
Attention should be drawn to the "Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activity for the Period until 2030" (adopted in 2017), which openly mentions non-strategic nuclear weapons. It states: “In conditions of escalating military conflict, demonstrating readiness and determination to use force employing non-strategic nuclear weapons serves as an effective deterrent factor.” It also notes that “Indicators of the effectiveness of measures for the implementation of state policy in the field of naval activity include... the capability of the Navy to inflict damage on the enemy fleet at a level not lower than critical using non-strategic nuclear weapons...”
The President's address to the Federal Assembly in 2018 concludes the developments of the 2010s. The President's addresses should be considered on par with basic documents since they specify the provisions of the Military Doctrine, the Foreign Policy Concept and other doctrinal documents. Vladimir Putin reiterated the statement about using nuclear weapons when Russia is attacked with conventional weapons and the very existence of the state is under threat. He also specified that Russia's nuclear response would follow immediately in response to a nuclear attack of any yield.
The 2020s: Lowering the Threshold Again
In June 2020, for the first time, Russia released an open version of the "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence", its most detailed public document on nuclear policy. It summed up the provisions that has been used in previous doctrines and outlined the following conditions for nuclear weapon use:
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Arrival of reliable data, indicating a ballistic missile attack on Russia or its allies.
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Use of nuclear weapons or other WMDs against Russia or its allies.
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Attacks on Russian critical government or military sites that undermine nuclear response capabilities.
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Aggression against Russia with conventional weapons when the state's very existence is jeopardised.
The 2021 Military Doctrine of the Union State updated its language, considering any military action against a member state as an attack on the Union State, warranting a response using all available means, potentially including nuclear weapons.
On 25 September 2024, President Putin announced proposed changes to the nuclear doctrine:
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Any aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state, involving or supported by a nuclear state, would be considered as a joint attack.
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Nuclear weapons could be used upon receiving reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons crossing Russia's borders, regardless of the payload type.
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Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an enemy's conventional attack creates a critical threat to sovereignty, including in defence of Belarus as a Union State member.
These proposals indicate a lowering of the nuclear threshold, expanding the scenarios under which Russia might consider nuclear weapons use.
Analysis
While a detailed examination of the forthcoming doctrine is pending the official release of the full text of the new document (besides, many things have already been said about Putin's statement [2]), several implications should be mentioned:
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NNWS may become targets of Russia's nuclear weapons in specific circumstances.
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The current developments again confirm the idea that Belarus has explicit protection under Russia's nuclear umbrella (or always had), even against conventional attacks, highlighting its unique status among Russia's allies.
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Russia is once again seeking an appropriate role for its nuclear arsenal and, in response to the changing security environment (not only in Europe), is lowering a bit the nuclear threshold. The concept of a “critical threat to sovereignty” has been introduced, replacing the former condition of “when the very existence of the state is under threat.”
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Russian Federation Security Council has “Standing Conference on nuclear deterrence” which is held twice a year (it is unclear whether the conference is a new thing or has appeared before 2024).
The developments with regard to the nuclear threshold and allies are not entirely unique. NATO's nuclear policies also provide member states with nuclear protection against conventional attacks. The United States states that it “would consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” [3]
Conclusion
Over the past decade, Russia appeared to raise the threshold for nuclear use, focusing more on existential threats to Russia’s statehood and preservation of the ability of retaliatory actions of nuclear forces when it comes to aggression with conventional weapons. The recent shift signals a return to earlier, more flexible stances (with some clarifications and innovations), potentially lowering the nuclear threshold amid evolving global security challenges. Moreover, among CSTO allies, Belarus always stands out, as it has more scenarios where the Russian nuclear arsenal would come to its protection. The mentioned concepts exist not only in Russian strategic practice but also in other nuclear-armed states and alliances.
While official doctrines provide insight into a nation's strategic thinking, they may not fully capture the complexities of nuclear decision-making (since there are classified versions of documents with detailed operationalization plans). However, these documents are the officially accepted views and guidelines of the country’s leadership. They are an official response to changes in the world arena, and the addressees of such documents are other states. Alexey Arbatov [4] aptly noted in September, “The doctrine is aimed at them. For us, the nuclear doctrine is not a legislative act or an article of the Constitution. If the issue of using nuclear weapons ever has to be considered, it is unlikely that the president will start by reading the nuclear doctrine.”
Nikita Degtyarev is a Research Assistant for Open Nuclear Network, where he works on the testing of tools for open-source data analysis and supports ONN’s nuclear programmes research. His research interests include nuclear risk reduction, nuclear non-proliferation, Russian and NATO nuclear policy. Prior to joining ONN, Nikita was an Information & Publications Programme Coordinator at the PIR Center, where he wrote and edited papers related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control. He also produced the e-journal Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) and managed the organisation's website and social media accounts. During his master's degree studies, Nikita interned at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, conducting research on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements and long-range conventional missiles in Europe. He also interned at the Representative Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Nikita received his bachelor's degree in International Relations from Ural Federal University in Yekaterinburg, Russia. He is a graduate of the dual degree master's programme at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS) and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), majoring in global security, nuclear policy and WMD non-proliferation.
Endnotes
[1] The translations of quotes here and throughout are provided by the author (unless otherwise specified).
[2] See, for example: Dmitry Stefanovich, ‘Что изменится в новой версии российской ядерной доктрины’ [What will change in the new version of the Russian nuclear doctrine], Профиль, 4 October 2024, https://profile.ru/military/chto-izmenitsya-v-novoj-versii-rossijskoj-yadernoj-doktriny-1602064/; Andrey Koshkin, ‘Горячая тема № 15, 2024. Меняем подходы: новое о применении Россией ядерного оружия’ [Hot Topic #15, 2024. Changing Approaches: New Information on Russia's Use of Nuclear Weapons], ПИР-Центр, 27 September 2024, https://pircenter.org/editions/gorjachaja-tema-15-2024-menjaem-podhody-novoe-o-primenenii-rossiej-jadernogo-oruzhija/; Alexander Gabuev, ‘How Serious a Threat Is Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 October 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/09/russia-nuclear-doctrine-blackmail?lang=en; Heather Williams, ‘Why Russia Is Changing Its Nuclear Doctrine Now’, CSIS, 27 September 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-changing-its-nuclear-doctrine-now.
[3] Author's underlining.
[4] Head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).
