- To celebrate the 70th "Victory Day" (Korean War armistice) anniversary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) staged a military parade on 27 July 2023, which was centered around the DPRK’s nuclear forces.
- Most of the nuclear weapon systems showcased have either finished testing or are in an advanced phase of testing, demonstrating the maturity of existing nuclear weapon systems, and the DPRK’s intentions to (1) compensate for its inferior conventional military capabilities with nuclear strike systems and (2) showcase strategic deterrence against the US.
- Two types of large drones displayed during the 27 July parade could potentially observe the entire area of the Republic of Korea (ROK) while flying within the DPRK’s own airspace. Once deployed, they could potentially support the operation of the DPRK’s nuclear force in the region.
- With high-level attendance from China and Russia, the 27 July parade symbolized Pyongyang’s increasing alignment with Beijing and Moscow, and also served to create an impression that the two countries tolerate or even tacitly endorse the DPRK’s nuclear weapon programmes.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and not necessarily those of Open Nuclear Network or any other agency, institution or partner.
Key Findings
Parade Overview
To celebrate the 70th "Victory Day" (Korean War armistice) anniversary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) staged a military parade on 27 July 2023. A total of 11 modern weapon formations participated in the parade, which highlighted the DPRK’s nuclear weapons; among the 11 types of weapons, eight types are nuclear capable or are designed exclusively for nuclear weapon delivery. Two out of the three non-nuclear capable weapons could potentially provide crucial protection or support to the operation of nuclear forces (Table 1).
With the exception of Hwasong-12B, all nuclear delivery systems showcased during the parade have either finished testing or are in an advanced phase of testing. While the DPRK often showcases new, previously unseen equipment during parades, the absence of such items is not necessarily a sign of lack of progress, but may instead demonstrate the maturity of existing nuclear capabilities.
The section below includes further information on the paraded nuclear-capable weapon systems that have either been deployed or in an advanced testing phase. The multi-purpose combat drone is also included in this section due to its potential to support the operation of the strategic rocket force.
Regional Nuclear Strike Force
Aero-ballistic Missiles
The tactical missiles (KN-23, KN-24, KN-25), land-attack cruise missiles and underwater attack drones showcased during the parade belong to a new generation of nuclear weapon delivery systems with region-wide range, mainly targeting the Republic of Korea. [11] According to display boards shown to Kim Jong Un in March 2023, all these weapons could accommodate a nuclear device with a diameter of ~460 mm, namely the Hwasan-31. [12] In comparison, nuclear devices showcased by the DPRK in previous Kim Jong Un inspections have a diameter of ~600 mm. [13] The reduced size of nuclear devices potentially enables smaller delivery systems to become nuclear capable, making the DPRK’s nuclear force more survivable and diversified.
Since May 2019, five types of aero-ballistic missiles that utilize similar aerodynamic layout and technologies to cover different ranges have been flight tested by the DPRK (Table 2) [14]. The KN-23 and KN-24 showcased during the 27 July parade are the first two among these five types of aero-ballistic missiles, which fly within the atmosphere and rely on means of aerodynamic control to conduct maneuvers that may potentially complicate missile defense efforts. However, the reported downing of similar Russian missiles by Patriot surface-to-air missiles in Ukraine [15] shows that modern air defense systems could work effectively against aero-ballistic targets despite the relatively irregular flight profile.
The truck-carried version of the KN-24 was shown for the first time during the 27 July parade (Figure 1), making the KN-24 the second type after the KN-23 to have more than one launch platform among the five types of ballistic missiles. This demonstrated the DPRK’s efforts to diversify and increase launch platforms with lower maintenance costs (truck chassis are cheaper to service than tracked chassis). Further, their relatively high launch frequently indicates that the KN-23 and KN-24 are the most important types among the five aero-ballistic missiles.
Underwater nuclear attack drones
The 27 July parade also for the first time clearly presented an underwater nuclear attack drone that may belong to the Haeil series (Figure 2). The DPRK claimed that the secret project of the Haeil series drones was started in 2012, and since January 2021, over 50 terminal-phase developmental tests have been conducted on the series. [17]
Since March 2023, the DPRK has publicly reported on three tests of Haeil series drones. During these tests, the Haeil series drones reportedly cruised with an average speed of ∼14 km/h (∼7.6 knots) and for a distance of up to 1000 km (Table 3). [19]
In the official report on the tests of the Haeil drones, the DPRK openly admits the conventional military superiority of its opponents and claimed that the mission of the Haeil drones is to create “radioactive tsunami through underwater explosion to destroy naval striker groups and major operational ports of the enemy.” [20] According to underwater nuclear tests conducted by the US in the 1940s, underwater nuclear explosions could bring heavy and irreparable damage to navy vessels. [21] In this regard, the Haeil series drones are consistent with other DPRK attempts to compensate for its conventional military vis-a-vis the overwhelmingly superior ROK and US conventional military with nuclear weapons. [22]
The DPRK’s "Global Hawk and Reaper"
Two types of large drones, first publicly displayed during the 26 July "Weaponry Exhibition-2023" in Pyongyang, [23] also participated in the 27 July parade (Figure 3). One of the drones, referred to by the Korean Central Television (KCTV) as “Morning Star-4 strategic reconnaissance drone”, [24] closely resembles the US RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude reconnaissance drone. The other one, referred to by the KCTV as “Morning Star-9 multi-purpose combat drone”, [25] has a similar appearance to the US MQ-9 Reaper.
Normally such drones can be operated over very long distances via communications satellites; however, DPRK does not possess such satellites. Nonetheless, the limited depth of the Korean Peninsula may largely eliminate the need for satellite communications. For example, if the flight ceiling of the “Morning Star-4” and “Morning Star-9” is roughly comparable to that of the US RQ-4 and RQ-9 (∼19 km and ∼15 km, respectively), [27] they would have a radar horizon of roughly 500 to 600 km, [28] enough to cover all of the ROK territory when flying within the DPRK’s own airspace. Once deployed, they could potentially improve the DPRK’s overall situational awareness and provide information for regional nuclear delivery systems on time-sensitive targets. The drones could also be used to monitor the DPRK’s own nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missile launches to provide additional or better flight data.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The DPRK displayed two types of its newest ICBMs, the Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18, during the 27 July parade. The Hwasong-17 ICBMs at the 27 July 2023 parade included a skirt section, though in the most recent Hwasong-17 launch in March 2023 the previously-included skirt section had been removed (Figure 4). The 27 July parade also showcased the Hwasong-17 ICBMs in camouflage. However, the checkered pattern (often painted on prototypes to facilitate optical tracking) on older Hwasong-17s is still visible despite the camouflage overpaint (Figure 5).
These two observations about the skirt reappearance and the camouflage overpaint suggest that the Hwasong-17s displayed during the 27 July parade are likely not newly produced, and that the Hwasong-17 may have entered service of the strategic rocket force. However it is possible that the paraded ICBMs are non-operational mockups — without further information, the parade display can not be relied upon solely to judge DPRK ICBM production. [31]
The Hwasong-17 is the largest liquid-propellant, land-mobile ICBM of the DPRK. Normally, large liquid-propellant, land-mobile ballistic missiles have to spend hours at their outdoor launchpad to be fueled after the missiles have been erected. However, evidence suggests that the DPRK may have achieved the fuelling of liquid-propellant ICBMs at a horizontal position indoors [32] as well as some limited movement of fully fuelled liquid-ICBMs outdoors.[33] These practices could potentially reduce the pre-launch preparation time in an outdoor environment, reducing its vulnerabilities vis-a-vis pre-emptive strikes.
In comparison, the second type of paraded ICBMs, the solid-propellant Hwasong-18, has completely eliminated the need for the fueling process. Possibly due to its better operational flexibilities, the Hwasong-18 may become an important element of the DPRK’s strategic deterrence, as evidenced by the official report on the parade describing the Hwasong-18 as “the most powerful core mainstay of the strategic force.” [34]
Political Implications
The 27 July parade, with a heavy focus on the DPRK’s nuclear strike capabilities, is the first military parade to have high level attendance from both China and Russia. While China has been sending high level officials to DPRK’s military parades celebrating big anniversaries since 2013 (60th armistice anniversary, 70th party founding anniversary and 70th state founding anniversary), the 27 July parade is the first DPRK parade with attendance of a top Russian official, in this cases, Russian defense minister Shoigu.
The attendance of these high-level officials at the 27 July parade symbolized Pyongyang’s increasing alignment with Beijing and Moscow, and served to create an impression that the two countries tolerate or even tacitly endorse the DPRK’s nuclear weapon programme.
[1] ''Viewbook of DPRK 10 October 2020 Parade'', Open Nuclear Network, 13 October 2020, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/viewbook-dprk-10-october-2020-parade
[2] For analysis on the KN-25, see: Tianran Xu, ''Update on the DPRK's 600 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System'', Open Nuclear Network, 13 February 2023, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/update-dprks-600-mm-multiple-launch-rocket-system
[3] ''Grand Military Parade Held to Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Great War Victory'', Korean Central News Agency, 28 July 2023, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/34cc52cb1b7dc0cfce87f88a3ab594d1.kcmsf
[4] DPRK’s land-attack cruise missiles were first revealed to the public in September 2021, see: Tianran Xu, ''Briefing on Recent DPRK Missile Launches 11-12 September 2021'', Open Nuclear Network, 14 September 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/briefing-recent-dprk-missile-launches-11-12-september-2021
[5] See: Tianran Xu, ''Preliminary Analysis of 30 September 2021 Anti-Aircraft Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', Open Nuclear Network, 1 October 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/preliminary-analysis-30-september-2021-anti-aircraft-missile-test-democratic-peoples. Tianran Xu, ''Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', Open Nuclear Network,18 October 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-0
[6] Colin Zwirko, tweet on 27 July 2023, available at: https://twitter.com/ColinZwirko/status/1684410662192300037?s=20
[7] Tianran Xu, ''Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', Open Nuclear Network,18 October 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-0
[8] The Hwasong-8, which is a shortened Hwasong-12 booster with a similar wedge-shaped HGV, was tested once, in September 2021. However, the HGV only reportedly reached Mach 3 during that test. A conical-shaped HGV, also on top of a shortened Hwasong-12 booster, has been tested twice, reaching a velocity of Mach 10. See: Tianran Xu, ''Observations on the 28 September 2021 Hypersonic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', Open Nuclear Network, 30 September 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/observations-28-september-2021-hypersonic-missile-test-democratic-peoples-republic. Yoo Hyun-min, 군 "북한 극초음속 미사일, 초기단계로 배치에 상당시간 소요" [Military "North Korea's hypersonic missiles are in an early stage and take considerable amount of time to deploy"], Yonhap News Agency, 29 September 2021, available at: https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210929099551504. Tianran Xu, ''Analysis of the 11 January 2022 Hypersonic Missile Test of the DPRK'', Open Nuclear Network, 14 January 2022, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/analysis-11-january-2022-hypersonic-missile-test-dprk
[9] The missile was first tested in April 2023: Tianran Xu, ''The DPRK's First Solid-Propellant ICBM Launch'', Open Nuclear Network, 14 April 2023, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/dprks-first-solid-propellant-icbm-launch
[10] First successful test took place in November 2022. See: Tianran Xu, ''Brief on DPRK ICBM launch on 18 November 2022 - Updates, 21 November 2022'', Open Nuclear Network, 21 November 2022, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-dprk-icbm-launch-18-november-2022-updates-21-november-2022-0
[11] Some are also capable of striking targets in Japan, China, and Russia.
[12] Tianran Xu, ''Size Estimates of DPRK's Nuclear Devices'', Open Nuclear Network, 29 June 2023, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/size-estimates-dprks-nuclear-devices
[13] Tianran Xu, ''Size Estimates of DPRK's Nuclear Devices'', Open Nuclear Network, 29 June 2023, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/size-estimates-dprks-nuclear-devices
[14] Their designations have been revealed by State media since October 2021, see:Tianran Xu, ''Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'', Open Nuclear Network,18 October 2021, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-0. Colin Zwirko, ''North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis'', NKnews, 3 April 2023, available at: https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-reveals-internal-names-for-several-missile-systems-analysis/. Colin Zwirko, tweet on 27 July 2023, available at: https://twitter.com/ColinZwirko/status/1684458112441540608?s=20
[15] Scott Neuman, ''Ukraine says its newly fielded U.S. Patriot system downed a Russian hypersonic missile'', NPR, 6 May 2023, available at: https://www.npr.org/2023/05/06/1174505616/ukraine-patriot-defense-russian-hypersonic-missile-kinzhal
[16] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023. available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 01:57:38
[17] ''Important Weapon Test and Firing Drill Conducted in DPRK'', KCNA, 24 March 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/8f6050fdcdec7876cc135c0378202bf2.kcmsf
[18] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 01:58:33
[19] Derived from reports. See:''Important Weapon Test and Firing Drill Conducted in DPRK'', KCNA, 24 March 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/8f6050fdcdec7876cc135c0378202bf2.kcmsf. Underwater Strategic Weapon System Test Held, KCNA, 28 March 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/157b396134cde3c32e088572b35b96d1.kcmsf. Underwater Strategic Weapon System Tested in DPRK, KCNA, 8 April 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/60b94d23ec268fd46544a32f12d05b1b.kcmsf
[20] See: ''Important Weapon Test and Firing Drill Conducted in DPRK'', KCNA, 24 March 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/8f6050fdcdec7876cc135c0378202bf2.kcmsf
[21] See: ''Operation Crossroads'', Atomic Heritage Foundation, 1 July 2014, available at: https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/operation-crossroads/
[22] ''Important Weapon Test and Firing Drill Conducted in DPRK'', KCNA, 24 March 2023, available at: http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/8f6050fdcdec7876cc135c0378202bf2.kcmsf. This is also reflected in a 20 February 2023 State media report, which threatened to neutralize advanced air force assets of the US and the ROK through nuclear strikes against airbases in the ROK. See: ''Multiple Rocket Launching Drill by KPA'', KCNA, 20 February 2023, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/8c1cf49be92a75dfbb10e450c809a392.kcmsf
[23] ''Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Weaponry Exhibition House with Sergei Shoigu'', KCNA, 27 July 2023, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/aa41568334781eb1afd7508a4a5ed883.kcmsf
[24] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 00:00:12
[25] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 00:00:12
[26] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 01:59:59
[27] ''RQ-4 Global Hawk'', US Air Force, available at: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104516/rq-4-global-hawk/. ''MQ-9 Reaper'', US Air Force, available at: https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/
[28] ''Radar Horizon Calculator'', available at: http://www.mar-it.de/Radar/Horcalc/horcalc.htm. Calculation is made with ROK’s average elevation of 282 m. See: South Korea, World Data, available at: https://www.worlddata.info/asia/south-korea/index.php#:~:text=South%20Korea%20is%20comparatively%20low,neighboring%20country%20of%20South%20Korea
[29] ''Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New-type ICBM of DPRK's Strategic Forces'', KCNA, 19 November 2022, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/3d89e96d4ca3a9372b55987333d3e2c8.kcmsf. Demonstration of Toughest Response Posture of DPRK's Strategic Forces, KCNA, 17 March 2023, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/e6a5ad1eb4cf499d76874d5eb90e8258.kcmsf. ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 02.03.34
[30] ''N. Korea's massive military parade: ICBMs and drones'', Yonhap News Agency, 29 July 2023, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4Gkf_ycdoY&ab_channel=NORTHKOREANOW, starting from 02.03.34
[31] In the February 2023 military parade, the DPRK showcased an unprecedented number of 16 very large transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) carrying ICBMs. However, US military intelligence assessed that "North Korea will probably be unable to outfit all of the paraded ICBM-class TELs with operational missiles capable of striking all of the US." See: Idrees Ali, David Brunnstrom, ''North Korea parade “probably oversells” ICBM threat -leaked document'', Reuters, 11 April 2023, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-parade-probably-oversells-icbm-threat-leaked-document-2023-04-11/
[32] Tianran Xu, ''Two key questions about North Korea’s new missile'', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 22 October 2020, available at: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/two-key-questions-about-north-koreas-new-missile/
[33] Tianran Xu, ''24 March 2022 DPRK ICBM Test'', Open Nuclear Network, 25 March 2022, available at: https://opennuclear.org/publication/24-march-2022-dprk-icbm-test
[34] ''Grand Military Parade Held to Celebrate 70th Anniversary of Great War Victory'', KCNA, 28 July 2023, available at: http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/34cc52cb1b7dc0cfce87f88a3ab594d1.kcmsf
