UN Security Council Sanctions on the DPRK

The United Nations Security Council first applied sanctions on the DPRK in October of 2006 following the country’s withdrawal from the NPT, the breakdown of negotiations to get it back to the agreement, its launch of seven ballistic missiles and, most importantly, its testing of a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. UN sanctions have remained in place since 2006, and they became increasingly broad (or non-discriminating on the entire population) over time, particularly with the five resolutions passed in 2016 and 2017. The Security Council is currently deadlocked over the continuation of the sanction regime, with the P3 (the US, the UK and France), led by the US, drawing attention to the non-implementation of the existing UN sanctions by China and Russia and the P2 (China and Russia) calling for sanction relief on humanitarian grounds and in order to trigger renewed negotiations. Russia’s reported violation of UN sanctions against DPRK arms exports in 2024, and UN Panel of Expert reports that its oil exports to the country exceeded the caps set by the UN on oil imports in previous years, signalled the extent to which the sanctions regime had broken down. Russia vetoed the continuation of the work of the UN panel of experts for the DPRK regime in April 2024, eliminating one of the principal sources of public information about sanction implementation.[1]

UN sanctions on the DPRK have proceeded in four phases. The first set of restrictive measures between 2006 and 2012 were quite targeted and limited to sanctioning the elite and the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The second phase between 2013 and 2015 involved a limited broadening of the existing UN sanctions through the application of conditional measures. The third phase in 2016 and 2017 entailed a rapid expansion of the sanctions until they approximated comprehensive measures. The fourth phase, from 2018 to the present, has consisted of US unilateral “maximum pressure” on the DPRK, followed by halting negotiations in 2018 and 2019, and the breakdown of consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council thereafter.

Narrow UN sanctions targeting DPRK’s elite and nuclear- and ballistic missile-related programmes (2006–2012)

The initial round of UN sanctions imposed on North Korea on 14 October 2006 targeted primarily the country’s elite and its nuclear-, ballistic missile-, and other WMD-related programmes. It included a ban on the import of luxury goods to North Korea and an import and export embargo on specific arms and proliferation-sensitive goods and technology. Demanding that the country retract its withdrawal from the NPT and refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, the Security Council further required North Korea to “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme” and “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”[2]

Despite repeated warnings, North Korea launched a long-range rocket over Japan on 5 April 2009. The Security Council condemned the launch on 13 April 2009 and decided to designate additional goods and entities for sanctions.[3] In response, North Korea announced it was ceasing cooperation with the IAEA, pulling out of the Six-Party Talks, and resuming its nuclear enrichment programme. The country conducted its second nuclear test and launched three short-range missiles in late May 2009, following the designation of three entities for UN sanctions.

After the second North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council strengthened the existing UN sanctions by additional restrictions on arms and WMD-related materiel.[4] Resolution 1874 of 12 June 2009 also imposed a conditional bunkering ban, provisions for enhanced sanction implementation though cargo inspections and the creation of a sanction monitoring expert panel, and calls for further financial restrictions. In July 2009, additional designees were added to the travel ban and asset freeze lists,[5] which were first authorised in October 2006, but remained without designees until April 2009, in part to induce Pyongyang to engage in negotiations.

Limited broadening of UN sanctions through conditional sanctions (2013–2015)

The existing sanctions on North Korea were strengthened on 7 March 2013 following the conduct of a third North Korean nuclear test on 12 February 2013.[6] Through a range of conditional sanction measures,[7] the resolution targeted financial institutions and oversees cash couriers, provision of public support for trade with North Korea, North Korean nationals engaged in sanction violations, and vessels refusing inspections. It also encouraged Member States to exercise vigilance over North Korean diplomatic personnel, impose an aviation ban in cases of reasonable grounds for sanction violations, prohibit the supply of any item that could contribute to proscribed activities, and put additional restrictions on the financial sector in place where such engagement could contribute to sanction violations.

The second round of UN sanctions, which also included additional sanctions designees, was marked by increased pressure on North Korea from China, which for the first time co-drafted the sanction resolution together with the US. This signalled increasing isolation of North Korea as an international outlier and a more effective signalling on the part of the Security Council regarding the unacceptability of North Korea’s behaviour. The increased pressure on North Korea, including that from the Bank of China, which severed its relations with Pyongyang, led to more constraint on its nuclear and ballistic missile activities. It did not prevent them, however, as North Korea continued to engage in prohibited activities and develop more sophisticated sanction evasion methods. An attempt to restart the stalled six-party talks was undertaken by China in September 2013, but was ultimately unsuccessful as North Korea called for the resumption of talks without preconditions and restarted its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. South Korean efforts to restart the talks in early 2015 were similarly ineffective, with North Korea refusing any dialogue seeking unilateral denuclearization or an Iranian-style nuclear deal. The country’s nuclear status, which was enshrined in its constitution in 2012, become an increasingly central part of both the official state ideology and the country’s conditions for the resumption of the six-party talks.

Rapid escalation of UN sanctions through new sectoral restrictions (2016–2017)

Following the fourth North Korean nuclear test on 6 January 2016, claimed to represent its first successful hydrogen bomb test, the Security Council embarked upon an unprecedented expansion of UN sanctions. Four rounds of sectoral restrictions were added in rapid succession between March 2016 and September 2017 in response to North Korea’s nuclear- and ballistic missile activities, significantly increasing the scope of UN sanctions.

Resolution 2270 of 2 March 2016, jointly drafted by the US and China, expanded the existing arms embargo, increased the number of targeted sanction designees, and introduced new mandatory financial sector, commodity, transportation, and interdiction measures to target North Korean sources of revenue, diversion efforts, and evasion methods.[8] These included an import ban on aviation fuel, an export ban on North Korean coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals, and also a prohibition on joint ventures, the operation of North Korean banks abroad, and new financial institutions in North Korea, and a ban on the leasing, chartering, using, and servicing of North Korean aircraft and vessels. Additional conditional restrictions, including an aviation ban and expulsion and repatriation of North Korean diplomats, were also added, increasing the discretionary authority of Member States regarding sanction interpretation and application. North Korea responded with an increase in proscribed activities, while the US, China, and Japan complemented UN sanction measures with their own unilateral restrictions, signalling further international isolation of the country.

UN sanctions were further expanded on 30 November 2016, following the fifth nuclear test by North Korea, the second one in 2016 alone. Resolution 2321 introduced a cap on the export of coal and imposed a complete ban on the export of copper, nickel, silver, zinc and statues from North Korea to further limit the country’s revenue.[9] The resolution also imposed restrictions on the country’s diplomatic and consular activities, prohibited financial support for trade with North Korea, imposed a closure of any existing representative offices, subsidiaries, or bank accounts in North Korea, and authorised the expulsion and repatriation of any individual working on behalf of a North Korean bank or financial institution. It also called for a number of additional voluntary diplomatic, financial, and transportation-related restrictive measures.

The UN strengthened its sanctions on North Korea again following its July 2017 intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Resolution 2371 of 5 August 2017 removed the cap on permitted coal exports introduced in November 2016, imposed a ban on the export of North Korean lead, lead ore, and seafood, introduced a port entry ban on designated vessels, and limited the number of work authorizations for North Korean nationals working abroad.[10]

Additional UN sanctions were imposed on 11 September 2017, further broadening the increasingly comprehensive nature of the North Korean sanctionsregime. Resolution 2375, adopted unanimously in the wake of the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test, imposed a prohibition of ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean vessels, a ban on the export of textiles from North Korea, a prohibition on the import of condensates and natural gas liquids, and a limitation on the amount of refined petroleum products and crude oil imported to North Korea.[11] The latter had significant implications for fertilizer production and the agricultural sector in the country. The resolution also expanded the existing limitations on work permits for North Korean nationals and restrictions on banks and joint ventures.

Maximum pressure, fleeting negotiations and breakdown of consensus (2018–present)

The Security Council further expanded the already broad UN sanctions on North Korea on 22 December 2017 in response to the 29 November 2017 North Korean ballistic missile launch. Resolution 2397 added new individual and entity designations, tightened the existing caps on the imports of crude oil and refined petroleum products to North Korea, imposed mandatory repatriation of North Korean workers and supervisors from abroad, and introduced a large number of new import and export commodity restrictions, once again increasing the number of sectors affected by sanctions.[12] In particular, the resolution included a prohibition on the import of iron, steel, and other metals, and also on industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, and used vessels into North Korea and a ban on the export of food and agricultural products, earth and stone, wood, machinery, electrical equipment, and vessels from North Korea. The resulting scope of UN sanctions “effectively rendered the sanctions regime comprehensive.”[13]

On 16 December 2019, Russia and China presented a draft resolution calling for partial sanctions relief, without any concessions related to the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, citing concerns over the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions measures. The draft was shelved following opposition from other permanent Security Council members. The resolution was re-introduced with only minor tweaks at the end of 2021 and faced a similar response.

Although the cumulatively expanded UN sanctions are open-ended and have remained in place since 2017, the Security Council has become increasingly divided on the approach to be taken towards North Korea sanctions. The maintenance of the maximum pressure strategy by the US (even after the transition to the Biden administration) has come at a price. Faced with intransigence on the issue of sanction relaxation, both China and Russia have reduced their sanction implementation efforts by not only tolerating but also openly engaging in sanction violations, weakening the constraint experienced by North Korea. This was particularly visible in 2019, when the UN Panel of Experts noted a significant increase in the illicit export of coal by North Korea, including exports to China, and the direct import of refined petroleum products directly to the country in excess of the caps established by UN sanctions.[14] The increased sanction circumvention capacity of North Korea, and also procurement of currency through cyberattacks and cryptocurrency mining, also contributed to decreased constraint on the country in spite of the continuation of the stricter sanction measures.[15] The dissatisfaction of Russia and China with the maintenance of the maximum pressure strategy has also resulted in a failure to agree on any new sanction designations by the UN Sanctions Committee responsible for administration and implementation of the measures, despite increasing sanction violations by North Korea, particularly its significant expansion of proscribed ballistic missile launches in 2023 and 2024.

Conclusion

The current UN sanction regime, which has not been adjusted since the end of 2017, lacks crucial international support from permanent members of the Security Council, faces declining legitimacy, and has contributed to a range of undesirable effects, particularly with regard to the humanitarian situation in North Korea. This situation could best be changed by recalibrating the sanctions to make them more effective, rather than by abandoning them altogether. It is important to use calls for sanction relief strategically in order to facilitate a broader denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as agreed to by both the US and North Korea in the Singapore declaration of 2018.