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When Iranian drones started appearing in Ukraine, wielded by the Russian military, the question of what Iran may be receiving from Russia in exchange naturally arose. Some have since suggested that, in return for conventional weapons systems, including ballistic missiles, Moscow may transfer nuclear technology to Tehran, including nuclear weapons technology. So far, there has been no indication in the public domain to suggest that any such material or expertise transfers from Russia to Iran have actually taken place.
Yet, the expanding Russia-Iran relationship poses a nuclear proliferation threat of a different kind: the tacit acceptance of highly concerning Iranian nuclear activity. This not only reduces the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to address the threat of a nuclear Iran but undermines non-proliferation norms more broadly, signalling to other potential proliferators that they can expect political cover from powerful states.
Russia and nuclear diplomacy
As a permanent member (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and a nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia is an influential actor when it comes to the state of the global non-proliferation regime. Historically, Russia’s record on non-proliferation matters has been far from clean. However, Moscow has traditionally been broadly constructive on efforts to address particular proliferation challenges – including North Korea and Iran. Yet, as others have argued elsewhere, since 2022, Russian behaviour has become markedly counterproductive – and outright obstructive – on global non-proliferation and counter-proliferation challenges.
This has been particularly apparent on the question of the Iranian nuclear programme. Russia was broadly seen as a constructive actor in diplomatic efforts to reach the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA). Subsequently, during negotiations to return all parties to compliance with the agreement (following US withdrawal and Iranian violations) the Russian delegation was, by all accounts, instrumental in bridging gaps between Iran, the US and Europe. In March 2022, that appeared to have changed overnight, as the Russian negotiating team tabled demands that Russian trade with Iran be exempt from EU and US sanctions under any revived nuclear deal – demands which (among other challenges) derailed the negotiations. This proved to be the start of broader Russia counterproductive behaviour on the Iran nuclear question – arguably today’s most acute nuclear proliferation threat.
The expanding Russo-Iranian relationship is helping undermine an already weakening international non-proliferation regime. While there is currently no indication that Russia is actively supporting any weapons-relevant activity in Iran, it is helping to degrade non-proliferation norms and tools at the fringes with consequences for non-proliferation efforts as they relate to the Iran nuclear programme and more broadly.
Implications for the effectiveness of sanctions
The primary mechanism for pressuring Iran on the nuclear file has been the expansive patchwork of sanctions placed on the Iranian economy by the UNSC, the US, the UK, the EU and a number of other countries. Sanctions have both material and normative effects. They restrict Iran’s ability to raise funds and procure materials in support of its proliferation activity, while also designating Iran as an actor of proliferation concern. UNSC sanctions – because of their multilateral nature and their provenance from an organisation that (at least in theory) is meant to represent the interest of the international community – have particular normative value.
Technically, most economic activities with Iran are permitted under current UNSC sanctions. However, the UNSC’s continued engagement on the Iran nuclear file marks the country as a persistent threat to international security and the non-proliferation regime. Russia’s willingness to engage with Iran regardless, including in trade in military and nuclear technology, severely undermines the still-valuable normative impact these sanctions are meant to have. Outside whatever practical benefit the trade relationship may offer (the volume of economic trade between the two countries remains relatively low), it signals a tacit approval by a P5 UNSC member, a party to the JCPOA and an NPT nuclear weapons state of Iran’s highly concerning nuclear activities.
Furthermore, Moscow’s growing relationship with Tehran, namely, Russian reliance on Iranian drones in Ukraine has made it highly unlikely that the UNSC will adopt any new sanctions on Iran for its proliferation behaviour to strengthen the material impact on the Iranian economy. The option of reimposing historical UNSC sanctions on Iran, which had been suspended after the conclusion of the JCPOA, is still available; however, the so-called ‘’snap-back’’ provision expires in October of this year. The Chinese ‘Five-Point Proposition on the Iranian Nuclear Issue’, released by Beijing following a March meeting between Russian, Chinese and Iranian senior officials to discuss the Iran nuclear issue confirmed as much. The proposition included an explicit criticism of the ‘’use of force and illegal sanctions’’ and warned against ‘’hasty intervention by the UNSC’’. This greatly reduces the leverage of those remaining parties to the JCPOA, namely, the E3 (Germany, France and the UK) intent on finding a diplomatic resolution to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme.
Diplomatic cover
In addition to sanctions, the US and Europe have sought to increase diplomatic pressure on Iran through the introduction of resolutions at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling out Iran for its concerning nuclear activities and failures to cooperate with the IAEA in addressing outstanding questions over its nuclear programme. Russia – as well as China – have vetoed all four of the censure resolutions brought forward against Iran at the IAEA since 2022. The proposition issued following the March meeting in Beijing did call on Iran to honour its commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. However, it appears to have achieved no practical progress towards addressing specific concerns on the programme, including outstanding IAEA questions on past Iranian activity, or paving a path for further productive diplomacy. It did, however, offer Tehran a photo-op with Russian and Chinese senior representatives, and an opportunity for joint criticism of Western efforts to apply further pressure on Iran for its concerning nuclear behaviour.
The potential impact of diplomatic ostracisation and recrimination of Iran should not be underestimated. The country does not aspire to becoming a pariah state on par with North Korea but rather sees itself as a regional leader in the Middle East and an active economic and diplomatic actor on the global stage. Threatening to maintain and exacerbate, if needed, Iran’s economic and political isolation is therefore an important lever for convincing Iran to address international concerns over its nuclear programme. Russian and Chinese unwillingness to call out Iran for its nuclear activities and their willingness to continue economic and diplomatic engagement with Iran undermines these efforts. Not only that, it also sends a dangerous message to other would-be proliferators and those who may be willing to assist them that they can behave similarly and expect to be protected by powerful states.
Russian civil nuclear activities in Iran
A noteworthy aspect of the Russo-Iranian relationship is the countries’ cooperation in the civil nuclear sector. Russia has been involved in the construction of Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) since the 1990s. Russia’s state nuclear enterprise Rosatom is currently constructing additional reactor units at Bushehr. The recent Russia-Iran Strategic Cooperation Treaty includes commitments for cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy and Iran has expressed an interest in building more power plants with Russian support.
Cooperation with Iran on the construction of light water reactors (of the kind being built at Bushehr) is not prohibited under the JCPOA or other nonproliferation regimes. Iran, like any other party to the NPT, is of course permitted to pursue peaceful applications of nuclear energy under the NPT. However, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran under the current circumstances raises some concerns. Iran is a country of serious proliferation concern – one which has significantly reduced IAEA access to its programme and where the debate over the need to develop nuclear weapons is very active. Russian construction of light water reactors in the country is unlikely to offer Iran expertise or materials that it does not already possess. However, such engagement allows for the maintenance of active working relationships between the Russian and Iranian nuclear sectors and experts, which could theoretically be repurposed for nuclear transfers of a less benign sort. It also turns a blind eye and helps normalise what is in fact extremely irresponsible and worrying Iranian nuclear activities and rhetoric.
Raising the bar and holding to account
Russia can, and in fact should, play a role in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear question. As a party to the JCPOA, a P5 member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, Moscow has a responsibility to address the serious threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. In fact, because of its relationships with Iran, Moscow is uniquely positioned to exert pressure. If it chose to, Russia could, for instance, withhold its civil nuclear activities in Iran until Tehran agreed to reapply the Additional Protocol and fully cooperate with the IAEA. However, Moscow has thus far chosen not to bring this leverage to bear. Recent Russian and Chinese meetings with Iranian officials may be an effort to make some progress on the issue. However, they have yet to demonstrate any practical outcomes. There is also the risk that whatever is agreed between the three states falls well short of meaningfully and sustainably addressing international concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme.
The US and Europe will ultimately need to be involved in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, considering the threat the programme poses to their security interests and the importance of their engagement in providing Iran with the economic benefits it is after. Upcoming US-Iran talks in Oman – even if indirect – are a positive development and will help ensure that more than just Russian and Chinese interests are represented in any diplomatic efforts to address concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme. The options available to the US and Europe to incite Iranian cooperation are, however, limited. Those that remain must be leveraged for all their practical and, as importantly, normative value. As the author has argued elsewhere, reimposition of suspended UNSC sanctions on Iran before their expiry can and should be pursued if necessary, despite likely limited economic effects. Should considerable progress be made in any US-Iran negotiations between now and the expiry of the “snap-back” provision, the E3 may consider foregoing reimposition of sanctions; however, Iran must first take meaningful and sustainable steps to address outstanding concerns and cannot be allowed to simply wait out the clock until October. Should UNSC sanctions be ‘’snapped back’’, the US, Europe and other states concerned by Iranian nuclear activity will have to help support and enforce their implementation. This may include intelligence-sharing or further capacity-building measures with countries that may lack the necessary expertise or resources.
The US and Europe should also actively call out not only Iran for its irresponsible nuclear behaviour, but also those who tacitly endorse it or turn a blind eye, including Russia and China. Statements (joint or unilateral) from other states – at fora like the NPT Preparatory Committee or the IAEA General Conference – may also be helpful in placing pressure on Russia and China, as nuclear weapons states, to play a constructive role in calling out and holding to account concerning Iranian nuclear activity. Not engaging in the direct transfer of nuclear weapons technology to a state of serious proliferation concern should not be the bar to which nuclear states are held when it comes to upholding their non-proliferation commitments.
Darya Dolzikova is a Senior Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her research focuses on the strategic aspects of civil nuclear and nuclear weapons technology. Darya’s particular areas of expertise are on the Iranian nuclear programme and on military threats to nuclear facilities. She has also conducted extensive work on broader nuclear proliferation trends, the use of sanctions as a counter-proliferation tool and Russia's role in global nuclear supply chains.
Contact: daryad@rusi.org
