Overview of the DPRK Sanctions Regime: China

First draft completed in July 2022; updated in May 2024. 

1. Implementation of UNSC sanctions concerning DPRK[1]

In general, China implements UNSC sanctions against the DPRK by taking measures in three main categories: adopting executive measures by relevant Government agencies, contributing to activities in specialised organs established by the UN, and using national legislation to provide further justification for implementing the sanctions. Actions taken in the first two categories are usually directly associated with specific UNSC resolution requirements. However, in China’s national legislation, the spirit and principles of UNSC resolutions are implicitly embedded in broad legislative regulations, often without explicit reference to specific resolutions.

1.1  Implementation through executive measures

Theoretically speaking, the executive branch of the Chinese Government has the option of adopting new “departmental rules”[2] and/or publishing new “departmental regulatory documents”[3] to implement various international legal obligations and requirements, including those from various UNSC resolutions. The exact boundaries between departmental rules and departmental regulatory documents, however, are unclear. On the basis of on our research, the relevant ministries and departments under the State Council rarely establish new departmental rules to implement UNSC resolutions. This may be at least partly due to the fact that departmental rules are legislative documents and are legally binding, thus requiring a more rigorous and complex drafting and adoption process than departmental regulatory documents, which are administrative ones. Hence, this section reviews how the relevant Government agencies use departmental regulatory documents to implement UNSC resolutions related to North Korean sanctions.

Standardised procedures

Since the adoption of UNSC resolution 1718 in 2006, China has been tasking its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to initiate the sanction implementation procedures against the DPRK. According to the Chinese Government, such domestic procedures had been developed before resolution 1718, when China implemented other UNSC resolutions as a permanent member of the UNSC.[4] In these standardised procedures, the MFA–with the authorization from the State Council–usually issues a circular containing the UNSC resolution text and other relevant information to all Chinese ministries and agencies under the State Council and also the Foreign Affairs Offices of provincial governments, requesting them to implement the resolution. The circular is also copied to key departments affiliated with the Communist Party of China, the military, and the legislature. When the 1718 Sanctions Committee (formally known as the UNSC Sanctions Committee on North Korea) updates its sanctions list, the MFA often issues a similar circular and usually includes a concise summary of the resolution text.[5]

Implementing agencies

Upon receiving the circular, the relevant ministries are responsible for issuing appropriate measures according to the UNSC resolution. On trade-related matters, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the General Administration of Customs (GAC), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Transport (MOT), and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) are the major measure-drafting and implementing agencies. MOFCOM and GAC are responsible for publishing measures related to regulating or banning the trade of certain products.[6] When the products involve dual-use items and technologies, the MIIT, the CAEA, and sometimes the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) join MOFCOM and GAC in drafting and announcing the measures. The MOT was the lead implementing agency when the 1718 Sanctions Committee designated new entities for the sanction list. When the UNSC started to limit North Korean citizens working overseas in resolution 2371, the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA) became an additional agency contributing to the measure-drafting process.

Not all implementation measures can be traced to specific Chinese Government agencies. On financial sanctions, for example, no record of official documentation appears to be publicly available. In China’s National Implementation Reports submitted to the 1718 Sanctions Committee, measures related to financial sanctions are either carried out by “the competent Chinese authorities”[7] or “the Chinese Government,”[8] without mentioning any specific agencies. Within the structure of China’s State Council, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)–later replaced by China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) in 2018–is probably the agency in charge. Earlier news reports also indicate that the CBRC issued notifications to North Korean banks, warning them to operate according to relevant regulations.[9] Likewise, measures restricting China-DPRK scientific and technical cooperation and training programmes in resolution 2321 were also attributed to the “Chinese Government” without specifying any implementation agency.[10]

Efficiency

According to publicly available information,[11] Chinese Government agencies have been implementing sanction measures relatively efficiently. The lead agency–the MFA–usually issues a circular within two working days of the adoption of a new UNSC resolution (see Table 1) despite the half-day time difference between Beijing and New York.

Table 1: Time Interval between UNSC Resolution Adoption and Issuance of MFA Circular

For further implementation, import and export control measures are usually created and announced within a few days or weeks by MOFCOM and GAC. The same applies to the measures against DPRK enterprises in China. However, measures related to dual-use items and technologies are often announced with significant delay. The time interval between their announcement and the MFA circular ranges from two to eight months (see Table 2), indicating that identifying dual-use items and technologies for restrictions is far more complicated than that for other products as it may require multi-agency coordination involving organizations such as MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC, CAEA, and SASTIND.

Table 2: Time taken for issuance of MFA circular and dual-use item proclamation, after adoption of UNSC Resolution

1.2  China’s activities in specialised UN organs

Besides being a permanent member of the UNSC, China is a member of the 1718 Sanctions Committee and a participating country in the panel of experts (PoE) created through resolution 1874, both of which serve as crucial organs to facilitate effective implementation of sanctions against the DPRK.

China participates in the 1718 Sanctions Committee actively, although international observers debate about whether, or to what extent, this active participation has always enhanced the implementation of certain sanctions. Nevertheless, China has abided by the Committee’s requirements and submitted its National Implementation Reports punctually.[12] China has also duly notified the Committee every thirty days of its exports of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.[13] However, China, along with Russia, has reportedly used the issue of ton-barrel conversion rate to obstruct a potential Committee notification announcing that the annual barrel cap has been reached. This potential obstruction prevents the triggering of an immediate export stop for refined petroleum products to the DPRK by all UN Member States.[14] Divisions among the major powers also caused the failure of the Committee to agree on adding any business or entity to its target list since 2018.[15]

China’s contribution to the PoE has reportedly been more controversial. In March 2024, China abstained from the Security Council vote to extend the PoE’s mandate . Due to Russia’s veto, the Security Council failed to extend the mandate. Prior to this recent development, according to multiple accounts of PoE meetings, China had increasingly projected its Governmental representation on a panel supposed to be independent and technical. The Chinese member of the PoE even sought instructions from the Chinese permanent mission to the UN during PoE report negotiations.[16] Consequently, China reportedly often pressured the PoE to take out content that could embarrass China, which slowed down the release of PoE reports. In 2010 and 2011, for instance, Council records show that the releases of the PoE’s final reports were delayed due to China’s procrastination.[17] Similarly, in 2020, the PoE report went on line but inexplicably disappeared later in the day due to China’s reservations about its findings.[18] The disputed content is usually evidence indicating China’s potential non-compliance concerning relevant sanctions, such as satellite photographs of North Korean ships transferring coal and other restricted products to Chinese-flagged vessels. Similar to the dynamics in the 1718 Sanctions Committee, recent geopolitical tensions involving China have also affected PoE reports. The number of experts’ objections peaked in the PoE midterm report submitted pursuant to resolution 2569, which was written between February to August 2021–a period during which China and the United States had multiple high-level disagreements whereas the China-North Korean relations steadily improved as Mr. Xi and Mr. Kim met several times in person since 2018. As the United States increasingly portrays China as a power that does not adhere to a “rule-based order,” China has enhanced its efforts to refute such portrayal. Objections in PoE reports are likely a result of such growing political tensions.

Nevertheless, some of China’s cooperation with the PoE’s investigation went relatively well. In 2014, 2015, and 2016, the PoE included tables of Correspondence with Member States in its final reports submitted pursuant to resolution 2094, 2141, and 2207, which demonstrate the responsiveness of Member States to requests for inspections and missions to discuss implementation.[19] During these three years, among the 19 requests sent by the PoE, China responded to 15 of them. In comparison, the United States answered 2 out of 7 requests during the same period; and the numbers of answers compared to the total number of requests sent to all Member States are 32 to 64, 116 to 262, and 215 to 748 in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 reports respectively. Although the PoE has ceased to provide similar tables in its reports since 2017, on the text of the reports, China has continued to respond relatively actively to requests and inquires posed by the PoE.

Moreover, China has also provided evidence or conducted relevant research to support the PoE’s work. For instance, in the case of the supplying of lumber trucks to Pyongyang that were subsequently used by DPRK to carry long-range missiles in the birthday parade for Kim Jong-il in 2013, China provided an end-user certificate to show it had been informed that these trucks were to be used for the transport of lumber.[20] In responding to various potential smuggling activities conducted by fishing and cargo vessels, China conducted investigations of vessel numbers in China’s registration system, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, certificates of origins of cargo, port records, and vessel logbooks.[21]

In recent years, rising geopolitical rivalry between China and US-led Western countries seems to have significantly reduced Beijing’s interest in cooperating with Western nations to maintain pressure on North Korea. There have been growing allegations about China turning a blind eye to sanction-busting activities occuring near Chinese shores or involving Chinese port facilities.[22] Additionally, China’s military has interfered with Western warships and military aircraft that were reported to be monitoring North Korean activities in support of UN sanction resolutions, though this could have been influenced by China’s interpretation of coastal States’ rights under relevant international law, including the UNCLOS.[23] China’s recent abstention on extending the PoE’s mandate signals a deeper divergence between Beijing and Western capitals.

1.3  National legislation[24]

Despite China’s participation in relevant UN activities and its adoption of departmental regulatory documents directly related to pertinent UNSC resolutions and sanctions, China has rarely adopted domestic legislation purely based on international law[25] and has never based its regulations primarily on UNSC resolutions.[26] Usually provisions in China’s existing national legislation are aligned in principle with spirit of various UNSC resolutions. When implementing requirements in UNSC resolutions, China would identify existing relevant national legislation (if any) and cite it as a basis for its departmental rules described in 1.1. If the content of certain UNSC resolutions reveals a legal void in China, and if the content is exclusively a legislative matter that falls under the responsibility of the Chinese national legislature body—the National People’s Congress (NPC)—then the NPC will formulate new domestic legislation to fill the void.[27] 

For UNSC resolutions regarding the DPRK, China has cited over twenty existing domestic laws and regulations (see Annex 2) in its National Implementation Reports as the basis of China’s implementation.[28] Aside from these, a little national legislation that China passed in recent years appears to have possible connections with UNSC resolutions regarding the DPRK, though the actual degree and extent of the connections are hard to evaluate with certainty. For example, the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (ECL), which entered into force in December 2020, synergises various existing regulations on dual-use items, military products, and nuclear products and accords them a higher legal status. It also enhances end-user and end-use controls, sets up a comprehensive licensing system, and improves the control list regime. Theoretically speaking at least, the ECL provides China with a better legal framework for implementing export-related UNSC sanctions against the DPRK than previous separate regulations did. 

2. National sanctions against the DPRK

The Chinese Government has openly stated that it opposes the “wanton use” of unilateral sanctions in international relations. This strong opposition has been consistent when it comes to unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries outside the UNSC against the DPRK, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia, and China itself. In its National Implementation Reports submitted to the 1718 Committee, China has also frequently said that it urges certain States to cease imposing unilateral sanctions on entities or individuals of other countries according to their own domestic legislation.[29] As such, there is no public record showing that China has ever imposed formal unilateral sanctions against the DPRK, whether with regard to DPRK’s nuclear programme or its human rights record.

3. List of relevant national laws and regulations

Annex 1: Department rules

 

Abbreviations:

MFA                 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFCOM        Ministry of Commerce  

GAC                 General Administration of Customs

MIIT                 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

MOT                 Ministry of Transport   

SASTIND         State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

SAIC                 State Administration for Industry and Commerce

SAFEA              State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs

CAEA              China Atomic Energy Authority

 

Annex 2: National laws and regulations cited by the Chinese Government in its national implementation reports

Nuclear related:

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export

·       Measures on the Administration of, Approval for Transfer and Transit of Nuclear Items (for Trial Implementation)

Biological:

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies

Chemical:

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals

·       Controlled Chemicals List

·       Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Controlled Chemicals

·       Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies

Missile related:

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies

Military related:

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Arms Export

Sensitive items:

·       Measures on the Administration of Export Registration for Sensitive Items and Technologies

·       Measures for Administration of Import and Export Licensing of Dual-Use Items and Technologies

·       Administrative List for Import and Export Licensing of Dual-Use Items and Technologies

Other related laws and regulations:

·       Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China

·       Administrative Punishments Law of the People’s Republic of China

·       Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China

·       Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China

·       Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Import and Export Control of Technologies

·       Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Import and Export Control of Goods

·       Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection

·       Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Entry and Exit of Aliens

·       Administrative Measures for Outbound Investment

·       Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Licensing