Russia-DPRK Military Cooperation: A Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

On 9 November 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the North Korea–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty into law. Kim Jong Un, in his capacity as the President of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, signed a decree ratifying the treaty on 11 November 2024. The signing of this treaty marks a geopolitical shift with significant implications for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the broader East Asian security landscape. While comprehensive in scope, its essence lies in the restoration of the 1961 military alliance. The agreement raises concerns for several reasons.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had little reliance on North Korea, whereas Pyongyang depended entirely on Soviet military assistance. Moscow, wary of escalating conflict on the Korean Peninsula, was cautious in providing offensive weaponry, even refusing to supply missiles. Instead, North Korea had to acquire Scud missiles from Egypt in the 1970s in exchange for training Egyptian pilots. However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine transformed the relationship. North Korea emerged as one of Moscow’s few steadfast allies. Pyongyang’s decision to back a great power’s invasion of a sovereign state marks a stark departure from its long – standing adherence to the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity in the conduct of international relations.

The treaty also provides Russia with a formal basis for intervening in Korean Peninsula affairs.   However, its actions vis-à-vis North Korea have been raising concerns among Korean Peninsula observers.  By facilitating activities that weaken the effectiveness of UN sanctions intended to limit North Korea’s economic and military capacity, Russia may be indirectly supporting Pyongyang’s efforts to expand and modernise its nuclear arsenal. Additionally, this alliance might likely facilitate the transfer of advanced Russian weaponry and satellite technology to North Korea, further destabilising the region.

Crucially, Russia has become North Korea’s primary supplier of vital resources, including energy and food – two commodities that Pyongyang has historically lacked. With its economic challenges alleviated by Russian support, North Korea will have even fewer incentives to engage in negotiations with the US over denuclearisation or nuclear risk reduction.

As the alliance between North Korea and Russia deepens, regional actors – such as Japan, China, South Korea and the US – are reassessing their strategic calculations. The perspectives provided below by key regional experts on the ONN Advisory Council offer a nuanced understanding of how this development is shaping national security strategies and foreign policy choices.

Japan’s Perspective

Japan has recently expressed significant concern over the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. A draft of Japan's annual foreign policy paper, the Diplomatic Bluebook for 2025, highlights that such collaboration could adversely affect the security environment in Asia.

This concern is shared by other regional actors. In June 2024, senior officials from Japan, South Korea and the US jointly condemned the deepening military ties between North Korea and Russia. They expressed strong disapproval of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement. Japan's foreign minister, Takeshi Iwaya, reinforced these concerns during his visit to Kyiv in November 2024, underscoring the risks posed by this alliance.

Japan's broader response to escalating threats in Northeast Asia. including threats from North Korea, Russia and China, has been shaped by its 2022 policy of "fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defence capabilities." The key measures include:

1.  Strengthening extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US.
2. Increasing the military budget to approximately 2% of GDP over the next five years.
3. Introducing "counter-strike capabilities" to target military facilities in enemy territory.

Public opinion in Japan reflects deep ambivalence toward these developments. According to an August 2022 poll by the Japan Association of Public Opinion Polling[1], 59% of respondents believed that nuclear weapons may be used within the next 10 years. At the same time, an overwhelming majority supported Japan’s three non-nuclear principles (72%) and preferred "diplomacy for peacebuilding" (32%) over a "large increase in defence capability" (15%).

In light of these dynamics, Japan should reconsider its security policy. Rather than deepening reliance on extended nuclear deterrence, Tokyo could lead efforts to reduce regional tensions through diplomacy while reaffirming its longstanding non-nuclear stance. In particular, Japan should uphold and promote the “nuclear taboo”: the principle that nuclear weapons must never be used under any circumstances. This approach is especially critical as the growing alignment between North Korea and Russia may accelerate an arms buildup and undermine stability in the region. By championing diplomatic engagement and reinforcing norms against nuclear use, Japan has an opportunity to offer a constructive response to the evolving security dynamics in the region.

China’s Strategic Calculations

China has become increasingly uneasy with the security cooperation between Russia and North Korea. This alignment allows the two countries to escalate tensions in Eastern Europe and East Asia, respectively, in ways that jeopardise China’s strategic interests. North Korea’s dispatch of troops may be contributing to the prolongation of the war in Ukraine, drawing sustained international scrutiny to China’s perceived alignment with the emerging “axis of autocracies” and undermining its diplomatic efforts to improve relations with European countries.

Additionally, as previously noted, Russia’s reported loosening of restrictions on transferring advanced military technology to North Korea risks further eroding non-proliferation norms. This shift is likely to heighten security anxieties in South Korea and Japan, fuelling calls for an expanded US nuclear umbrella and possibly raising interest in indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. From Beijing’s perspective, this dynamic provides Washington with a convenient pretext to expand its military footprint in the region, which China sees as a direct challenge to its security.

North Korea’s involvement in the European war may also raise the interest of some NATO countries to take countermeasures in the Western Pacific – precisely the kind of expanded NATO military presence China is keen to prevent. Mutual military assistance between North Korea and Russia could embolden both nations’ aggressive postures. Chinese leaders have long been wary of Kim and Putin’s risk – taking tendencies, recognising that excessive provocations could deepen bloc – based confrontation and potentially drag China into an unwanted conflict with the United States and its allies. Beijing remembers the heavy costs of the Korean War – a conflict China did not initiate, yet one that thwarted its ambitions to unify Taiwan.

While Beijing continues to see value in strategic coordination with Moscow and Pyongyang where interests align, it aims to keep both relationships within its sphere of control and to minimise the risk of either partner pursuing reckless actions that could undermine its core security interests.

South Korea’s Difficult Balancing Act

South Korea has long walked a fine line in its relationship with Russia – a balancing act that has become increasingly difficult to maintain. For over a decade, Seoul has sought to preserve strategic dialogue with Moscow, particularly in relation to North Korea, while remaining a close US ally and a key part of the broader Western security architecture.

Economic considerations have also played a significant role. South Korea and Russia have maintained trade relations, and Russia’s potential influence over Pyongyang has been viewed as a useful lever in managing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This pragmatic approach has been especially evident since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. During that period, South Korea aligned diplomatically with the West but avoided openly hostile stances toward Moscow.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, put this policy to the test. While Seoul condemned the invasion – supporting critical resolutions at the United Nations and in other international fora – it refrained from sending weapons to Ukraine and maintained diplomatic engagement with Russia. Recent developments have further complicated this position. North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia has significantly altered the regional landscape, placing South Korea in a more precarious and complex strategic environment. In response, Seoul is under growing pressure to reassess its policy toward Moscow, yet such a shift is far from straightforward.

As a sign of these complexities, in February 2025, South Korea lifted certain sanctions on medical equipment exports to Russia, and major South Korean companies are reportedly preparing to resume business operations there. These moves coincide with ongoing ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine and the possibility of broader international sanctions relief.

Meanwhile, new security concerns are emerging. There is growing anxiety in Seoul that an emboldened North Korean leadership – particularly if its forces gain meaningful combat experience through their involvement in Ukraine  – may be more inclined to act aggressively, potentially even on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is further bolstered by the mutual assistance clause in its treaty with Russia. Having already acted in support of Moscow, Pyongyang is likely to expect reciprocal backing in a future crisis – raising the stakes for regional stability.

South Korea has yet to determine its next steps, considering both its strategic interests and domestic political constraints. Under the Biden administration, South Korea had supported Ukraine indirectly – backfilling weapons for NATO members while providing humanitarian, economic and other non-lethal aid. Although South Korea ranks among the world’s top arms exporters, sending weapons directly to Ukraine would require amending the Arms Export Guidelines, which currently bans lethal exports to active conflict zones.

Still, North Korea’s actions have prompted Seoul to deepen ties with European partners and NATO. It has also revived security dialogue with China for the first time in nearly a decade, reflecting shared concerns. Under Biden, South Korean intelligence and defence officials briefed NATO’s North Atlantic Council and Indo-Pacific partners on North Korea’s deployments to Russia. Such intelligence sharing is expected to intensify. Additionally, South Korea could assist Ukraine in conducting psychological operations. With Donald Trump back in office, South Korea’s strategic calculations have grown even more complex and uncertain.

Rethinking US Policy on North Korea

For decades now, American administrations have been faced with the vexing challenge of how to deal with North Korea. As Pyongyang’s military ties with Moscow deepen, Kim Jong Un is bolstered by his close alignment with Vladimir Putin in opposing a US dominated international system. At the same time, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continue to advance both in terms of quality and quantity. The dilemma facing US policymakers is a stark one: the geopolitical context relating to North Korea is rapidly evolving while the US approach has essentially stayed the same. The go-to formula of applying more sanctions combined with steps to pressure Pyongyang into negotiations focused on complete denuclearisation harkens back to a time that has passed.

 

The Biden administration’s North Korea policy largely focused on strengthening the US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific and partnerships with South Korea and Japan through extended deterrence. But deterrence on its own won’t secure peace on the Korean Peninsula. Without a diplomatic strategy that engages Pyongyang, an escalatory cycle of measures and countermeasures will only continue, heightening the risk of conflict and miscalculation.

 

President Trump has an opportunity to prioritise diplomacy in parallel to existing deterrence and coercive policies. Recent reporting indicates that administration officials are reviewing the US’s approach and exploring options for potentially restarting dialogue with North Korea, including summit level engagement. A key challenge will be persuading Pyongyang that talks with the US could still result in attractive benefits. As a starting point, placing an emphasis on stabilising relations, including reaching mutually agreed upon measures to prevent an inadvertent clash and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict makes a great deal of sense.

As efforts to end ongoing wars in Russia-Ukraine and Gaza remain uncertain, the Trump administration should pursue a pragmatic strategy that reflects current realities to avert a crisis with North Korea.

Conclusion: The Future of Regional Stability

The Russia-DPRK alliance represents a pivotal shift in global security dynamics. For Japan, China, South Korea and the US, this evolving relationship demands a strategic recalibration.

Japan faces domestic debates over its nuclear and defence policies, while China must carefully balance its alignment with Russia and North Korea against its long-term strategic interests. South Korea continues to navigate a careful balance with Russia despite strengthening ties with NATO and European partners, as reflected in its partial sanctions easing and signals of renewed economic engagement. Meanwhile, the US must reassess its North Korea policy, prioritising diplomacy alongside deterrence.

Recent developments in the Middle East, particularly rising tensions between Iran and Israel, add another layer of complexity. While Russia and Iran signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement earlier this year, it notably lacks a mutual defence clause, in contrast to the Russia-DPRK treaty. Despite rhetoric of an “unbreakable” alliance and strong condemnation of the US’s actions in Iran, Russia has shown little willingness to confront the US over Iran, especially while it remains embroiled in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s muted response during recent Iran-Israel escalations may undermine trust in Russian commitments, both in the Middle East and elsewhere. Indeed, while expectations persist that Moscow would back Tehran more robustly, its calibrated stance, shaped in part by longstanding ties with Israel, reveals the limits of that support. As President Putin recently remarked, “In Israel, there are nearly two million people who came from the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation... And of course, in modern Russian history, we always take this factor into account.” This hesitancy sends a broader signal: should North Korea face a crisis, Russian backing may likewise be constrained by other strategic considerations rather than alliance rhetoric.

As global alignments shift, Russia’s relationships, even those branded as “strategic”, may prove more conditional than enduring. This adds a note of caution for Pyongyang: while deepening its military ties with Moscow, it may need to consider the potential limits of Russian support in certain scenarios. As such, the durability and scope of this alliance could be influenced by shifting strategic calculations, contributing to ongoing uncertainty in the regional security environment.