Beyond borders, Below Thresholds: Operation Spider’s Web and the Shadow of Escalation

Ukraine’s 1 June 2025 covert drone attack, which struck around 15 high-value Russian aviation assets assets, including strategic nuclear-capable bombers, demonstrates Kyiv’s ongoing capacity to impose material costs far beyond the frontlines. Although the operation will highly likely have negligible impact on the overall trajectory of the conflict, the strike signalled to key European partners that Ukraine can still achieve operational surprise in a war now characterised by attrition and battlefield deadlock. [i]

Operation Spider’s Web is highly unlikely to compel the Kremlin to engage more earnestly in ceasefire negotiations. In contrast, President Putin may frame it as further evidence that Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation poses an existential threat to Russian national security. This perception will likely reinforce his determination to subjugate Kyiv through force rather than accommodate it through diplomacy.[ii]

The timing of the strike (immediately preceding peace talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations) could shape US perceptions. Moscow primarily seeks US non-engagement in the conflict, while Ukraine continues to press for sustained military, financial and diplomatic support. This asymmetry is creating a political dynamic in which meeting Kyiv’s open-ended requests requires greater political will from Washington than accommodating Moscow’s limited demands.

President Trump will likely interpret the attack as evidence that neither side is genuinely committed to peace negotiations. If such a perception contributes to the reduction or withdrawal of US military assistance, the attack may ultimately represent a strategic miscalculation: a short-term operational success that incurs long-term strategic costs.[iii]

These prospective consequences are reinforced by the structural reality that a negotiated ceasefire with Russia remains unlikely in 2025. Both sides maintain mutually exclusive negotiating positions and ongoing battlefield operations serve as instruments of information gathering, enabling each side to assess the other’s capabilities and resolve. Until further attrition or external pressure forces their positions to converge, incentives to pursue a negotiated settlement will remain limited.[iv]

Targeting perceptions

Ukrainian officials initially reported that over 40 Russian aircraft were damaged or destroyed – a figure repeated by mainstream Western media outlets. These figures were later revised down by more than half, following independent verification by fact-checking organisations using open-source media and satellite imagery analysis.

Nevertheless, this event underscores how widely propagated inaccurate information (even if later corrected) could shape threat perceptions. Following future attacks, inflated damage reports that are perceived as credible by influential political figures or the public could fuel pressure for escalation – regardless of the strike’s actual scale.

Although Russian officials publicly downplayed the magnitude of this specific attack, escalation risks may have been significantly higher had the strike inflicted greater losses. These could have included the destruction of more sensitive nuclear platforms or infrastructure, mass civilian casualties in a major population centre like Moscow, or the death of a senior figure within President Putin’s inner circle.

The Russian military is highly likely operating near full capacity, limiting future conventional response options.[v] However, Putin retains several pathways to escalate following potential provocations. These could include hypersonic or intermediate-range ballistic missile strikes on symbolic political targets (such as Ukraine’s parliament), mass military mobilisation efforts or steps along the nuclear escalation ladder.

Foreseeable risks

Although the scale and scope of Ukraine’s attack surprised many experts, a similar scenario was anticipated during a February 2025 forecasting workshop hosted by ONN. The workshop examined how CBRN-related disinformation in conflict environments could elevate the risk of escalation.

The workshop convened approximately 15 subject-matter experts (including analysts specialising in nuclear risk, non-proliferation and international security) to identify and assess plausible disinformation-influenced escalation pathways. One scenario involved Ukraine deliberately targeting and damaging a Russian ballistic missile or launch platform capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Participants saw this as a credible escalation path and assigned it a 23% probability of occurring by the end of 2026 – the highest likelihood among all radiological and nuclear escalation scenarios evaluated.

ONN: Image taken at the ONN forecasting workshop in February 2025.

In discussing this scenario, participants emphasised that disinformation surrounding the targeting of nuclear-capable delivery systems could play a critical role in shaping both domestic and international responses. The technical complexity of nuclear systems makes independent verification challenging in real time, enabling actors to exploit ambiguity and amplify misleading narratives. This disinformation could heighten the risk of misinterpretation, particularly when CBRN-related incidents are used to frame an adversary as reckless or existentially threatening. 

Accordingly, a core finding from the broader workshop was that escalation is not solely driven by objective battlefield developments, but is significantly influenced by how key actors perceive, frame and communicate adversary actions to domestic and international audiences. Actor perceptions (shaped by cognitive biases and domestic political landscapes) often diverge significantly from external assessments of proportionality or intent.

Based on these findings, participants recommended that crisis monitoring teams, diplomatic observers and risk reduction mechanisms focus their attention on the following high-risk indicators during any future periods of heightened tension:

·         The status of US–Russia relations, including negotiations.

·         Strategic signalling by states regarding CBRN use.

·         Military developments at nuclear power plants (NPP), especially Zaporizhzhia NPP.

·         Speeches by national leaders, particularly those linked to potential escalation risks.

·         Technical feasibility analysis of specific claims and evaluating the plausibility and consequences of alleged attacks.

The absence of a major response to Operation Spider’s Web may lead Kyiv to conclude that attacks on other components of Russia’s nuclear triad (such as ICBM bases or strategic submarine facilities) would likewise remain below Moscow’s escalation threshold. However, nuclear-capable fixed-wing strategic bombers do not hold the same operational centrality or symbolic weight as hardened ICBM silos or nuclear-armed submarine platforms, which are central to Russia’s second-strike capability. Strikes on these assets could trigger a qualitatively different response, particularly under conditions of domestic political pressure or disinformation-fueled misperception. As thresholds blur, there is growing risk that Ukraine’s perception of what is permissible will shift without clear consideration of where Russia’s true red lines lie.

For further details on the ONN forecasting workshop, please check back for the full report, scheduled for publication in July 2025.

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Raymond Gough is a Research Analyst for Open Nuclear Network (ONN), a programme of PAX sapiens, where he specialises in radiological and nuclear risks emanating from the war in Ukraine. With a primary focus on Russia and Ukraine, Ray devotes his time to analysing disinformation related to weapons of mass destruction, satellite imagery, and scenarios involving nuclear weapon use. Ray holds master’s degrees in Geopolitics from Charles University in Prague and East Asian Political Studies from National Taiwan University in Taipei. His career began as an intelligence specialist in the Royal New Zealand Airforce, where he developed expertise in satellite imagery analysis, geospatial data interpretation, and disaster relief operations. Ray’s service included a deployment to the Middle East in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, the US-led coalition against Islamic State. Before joining ONN, Ray served as the lead Russia-Ukraine analyst for New Zealand's National Assessments Bureau within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. As an all-source analyst, he produced both short-form and deep-dive reports, briefed senior decision-makers and cabinet ministers, and collaborated internationally with partners from across the intelligence community.
 
Contact: rgough@paxsapiens.org