Image source: UN Photo/Pernaca Sudhakaran. The views expressed in this post are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Open Nuclear Network or any other agency, institution or partner.
A few months ago at a workshop, I heard a colleague say, “what if a nuclear bomb is used and all we do is write about it?” I have had these words echoing in my mind since then – and they were still on my mind as I got on my flight over the Atlantic, heading to New York for the Third Preparatory Committee on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is the third and final “PrepCom” ahead of next year’s Review Conference, taking place during what has been described as a time of the highest nuclear risk since the Cold War. In the backdrop of the conference, one nuclear armed state, Russia, continues its war in Ukraine. In response, NATO states lean further on nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, and all of the NPT’s five nuclear weapon states (NWS) are pursuing rapid modernisation of their nuclear arsenals. North Korea, a former member state of the NPT (though their withdrawal was not recognised by the IAEA or UN), continues its own expansion of its nuclear and delivery capabilities. There are whispers of fears of another state following DPRK’s lead in withdrawing from the NPT, as the treaty faces criticism around its credibility. Israel, a nuclear armed state not signed to the NPT, continues its genocide in Gaza, marked with two incidents of nuclear threats by government officials. All over the world, members of the general public take part in weekend marches outside their government institutions and embassies, calling for action towards peace.
Where does the NPT fall in all this? Monday morning rolled around, and delegations from member states and an array of civil society organisations filled Conference Room 2 in the UN Building, ready to talk NPT and all things nuclear. I notice that I step into the room reminding myself to manage expectations – miracles can not happen here, and if they do, it probably will not be in the next two weeks.
Hosting in New York
When I attend disarmament and non-proliferation conferences, I like to gaze around the room where they take place. I am curious about the politics of diplomatic spaces and fora. To touch on a past Twitter (X) ramble, I feel it is important to ask whether the choice to host meetings in New York has wider implications for our outcomes from these conferences on peace and security. When catching up and saying hello, check-ins around the travel process to the US were a frequent topic of conversation amongst colleagues. Concerns were shared around Trump’s recent crackdowns at border control, and the administration’s approach to political freedoms. Whilst many did not seem to face difficulties at the border, I think there is an obligated bearing of vulnerability to attend a conference in the US. The visa process is difficult, complex and invasive. For people from minoritised communities, this experience is even more challenging. Whilst most states have delegations based locally, the cost associated with travel and accommodation to make it over to the US for a 2-week conference is high – and in most cases unrealistic for civil society.
An NPT Review Cycle goes through three PrepComs and a final RevCon across five years. First in Vienna, then Geneva, then New York and New York again (traditionally). Some might say as you work your way through each conference – and I should point out, each location – the vibe shifts, and mobility between state representatives and civil society individuals differs. The UN Conference Building in New York is designed in a way that maintains distance and division. Besides the Vienna Cafe and Riverview Cafe, there are few spaces to convene informal meetings or to approach one another, and conference rooms have multi-level layouts, placing civil society above – and away – from the main floor. State delegations are able to hurry away to a private delegate’s lounge, altogether making organic opportunities for civil society to engage with states more difficult and unlikely.
I think that the participation of civil society grows more important as the Review Cycle progresses – to offer expertise and consultation to states, maintain political pressure on them and take record of conference developments for public awareness. But in parallel, civil society participation declines. Whilst building an entirely new UN HQ might be unrealistic, these informal conversations raise interesting reflections around the suitability of New York, and the US more widely, as a location for convening meetings such as those of the NPT. This PrepCom agreed to host RevCon in New York as usual next year. Given the political trajectory the US is headed, I wonder whether it may actually be feasible to host a conference there in the coming years.
Conference high (or low) lights
The conference’s round of opening statements during the General Debate reiterated States Parties’ belief that the NPT is the “cornerstone” of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. But what does this actually mean? Alongside these standard reaffirmations, discontentment could also be heard through the room, which I sense grows increasingly polarised every year. Whilst non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) emphasised their growing concerns around the P5’s continued investment into their nuclear capabilities, further embedding nuclear deterrence into their doctrines instead of honouring their Article VI obligations, the NWS sidestepped acknowledging these statements, instead criticising each other’s “irresponsible” nuclear behaviour, shifting responsibility.
States Parties referred to the relevance of other treaty regimes, the CTBT, FM(C)T and in many cases the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Despite the NWS and nuclear umbrella states’ repeated rejections of the TPNW, it is worth noting that the TPNW’s entry into force in January 2021, and steady climb in ratifications since, should be a welcome step within the field. It is a recommitment by a majority of NPT states to a world free of nuclear weapons, at a time both vertical and horizontal proliferation are a key concern for the international community – bolstering the collective responsibility towards disarmament, which is widely understood as the NPT’s least implemented pillar. This sentiment echoed in a number of NNWS statements, emphasising the complementarity between both treaty regimes.
Key issues on the table included negative security assurances (NSAs), the Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME), and specific calls of concern around Iran’s nuclear activities and the DPRK’s expansion of its capabilities. Several states stressed the urgency for efforts at arms control, namely finding a successor agreement in time for New START’s expiration, and resumption of US-Iran implementation of their obligations under the JCPOA.
But the topic that took centre stage this year was “transparency and accountability.” Many statements centred on its importance, with NNWS highlighting the “special” responsibility of the P5 in this regard. I should highlight that transparency was described both in terms of doctrine and arsenals, suggesting that States Parties need to better understand one another’s security doctrines and reasoning around respective practices. Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland have made transparency a priority issue on their agendas throughout this Review Cycle, and this PrepCom’s engagement was similarly led by their efforts. This discussion was also closely tied to the topic of reporting, and the Draft Decision for Strengthening the Review Process made four key recommendations, including the suggestion to facilitate a formal interactive dialogue to discuss the five NWS’ national reports, on the expectation that each should submit a report ahead of next year’s RevCon. This year, of the NWS, France and the UK each hosted their own side events on the borders of the conference, during which they presented their draft implementation reports, and welcomed interactive discussion and questions from those in attendance. I consider these two events as some of the few positive moments in a long two weeks – states and civil society alike attended both events in high numbers and posed a range of questions and reflections to those presenting on behalf of each delegation. The UK delegation’s introduction of a “mailbox function” so that the nuclear community could send feedback and questions during the intersessional period was also popular. A chorus of those in both rooms expressed that whilst these side events were a positive and welcome step, such a session should be part of the formal proceedings of the conference – not an informal, optional event during lunch breaks – and I agree. It seems that France and the UK are unlikely to take any further steps towards transparency and accountability whilst other P5 states, namely Russia and China, strayed away from these efforts and side-stepped conversations around their obligations, whilst the US was not as heavily engaged, seemingly unsure of their stance or lacking political leadership given their domestic political changes. Ultimately, the PrepCom ended with no agreed outcome document, and it was understood that two unnamed states posed objections to the language on transparency and accountability, hindering progress towards consensus.
A notable moment came on the conference’s first day, from Russia, doing one of the things they do best – pinpointing procedural rules, setting the tone that the next two weeks wouldn’t be easy, though I do not think anyone thought they would be. Russia posed an objection to the particular participation of international and regional organisations – specifically the European Union, disputing their allocated time to deliver a statement during the first session of the General Debate and raising issue with who was chosen to deliver the statement on their behalf. Their argument was that if an EEAS representative was to speak on behalf of the EU, the statement should not go ahead of individual States parties. If an EU member state were to read the statement on behalf of the EU, then it would be ok. They implied a political reasoning here also – that the EEAS is arguably given special status over other international or regional organisations such as OPANAL and AFCONE. It seemed to paint an image of solidarity with African states in the room, notably given Ghana was the Chair for this PrepCom. On a technicality, this is a fair point – though I would note that this contention was useful in disrupting and delaying proceedings – a typical approach taken by Russia at such meetings. They have taken a similar position at past Biological Weapons Convention conferences (leading to several closed sessions), posing wider criticism to the participation of civil society in general, in turn posing challenges for the inclusivity of disarmament conferences and transparency for non-state actors in the room. The final session, which ironically involved comprehensive discussion on the topic of transparency, was also held as a closed session, understood as due to a continued contention by some states to the presence of civil society in the room as the conference drew to a close and crunch-time began.
In the second week of the conference, I woke up to a myriad of news alerts about India launching strikes on Pakistan and discussions of the nuclear threat posed by escalating tensions between these two nuclear-armed states. It felt surreal to head over to a meeting of the “cornerstone” treaty, sitting through a day of statements, and yet not hear a single reference to what was going on beyond the walls of the conference room. I recognise that the two states aren’t signed to the NPT, so technically, “it does not count”. But it leaves me, again, to wonder where the utility of the NPT lies, if it cannot address (or does not perceive itself as responsible to address) an immediate and urgent situation posing nuclear risk to the international community.
Another heated moment arose as the conference moved through closing statements, when the US, after some criticism of Russian and Chinese behaviour, urged other states to “join us in that dialogue instead of echoing empty and unverifiable proposals,” referencing ongoing No First Use policy debates. We watched this be met by a Russian statement that suggested the US representative had “not been raised well.” Chuckles and whispers ran through the room, amongst sighs from those who only continue to hope that every nuclear weapon state will at some point be willing to resume good-faith, meaningful efforts towards tangible steps for disarmament – arms control agreements, reductions in nuclear arsenals and enhanced transparency and accountability, instead of exchanging jabs on the conference floor.
In reflection
In between busy days, informal meet-ups and social gatherings took place as usual. I find these conferences offer one of the few yet valuable opportunities for civil society to catch up and coordinate with one another and to also engage more informally with diplomats. There is something to be said of the fact that every diplomat I met outside the conference room, during working hours and beyond, was keen to talk about the treaty, to debate it, discuss it, reflect on it, and find out more about what we within civil society were up to – regardless of their political position or state posture. It is a grain of hope that the people in the room are committed to the treaty’s progress (in their eyes). It may be helpful to remember that whilst our visions of success may differ, most of those in the room do care and do want success.
After two low-energy and arguably lacklustre weeks, the conference ended without a consensus agreement on an outcome document (both a document of recommendations to the Review Conference, and a document on the draft decision on Strengthening the Review Process). I’m hesitant to say that a failed consensus means a failed PrepCom entirely. An exchange of perspectives, maintained dialogue (no matter the disagreements), and thorough negotiation is still valuable and important. But it does not mean that next year’s Review Conference has little weighing on its shoulders. The positives of this conference do not absolve any of the States Parties of their responsibility to do something in the context of the worsening-geopolitical environment and increasing nuclear risk.
I came away with many thoughts, many worries and many reflections. It is a brave new world, and I think we are ushering in a new era in international politics – less stable, more polarised and heated. I think every actor’s role in the room has changed – but we are not exactly sure how and what this means. The P5 are acting increasingly independently from the pressure of the international community and advocacy action alike. Non-nuclear weapon states must grapple on whether powerful, condemning statements are enough to shift us away from growing instability. Civil society experts are no longer directly contributing to the negotiation of arms control treaties and our presence in the room faces further challenges and obstacles. The evermore precarious funding landscape means our capacity is in some ways limited, and our more radical ideas are less likely to be funded, trapping us in this cycle. Where does this all leave us?
The political stalemate between the five nuclear weapon states, and growing disillusionment of the rest of the NPT community only exacerbates these risks. If consensus at the RevCon fails, it will have been 16 years since NPT member states were able to agree on anything. At this point in time, we may not be able to afford such an outcome (or lack thereof). It will continue to severely undermine the credibility of the NPT, and the treaty’s role in maintaining norms around the nuclear taboo and wider peace and security, that are in many ways, hanging by a thread.
Anahita Parsa is a Policy Fellow on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at BASIC, working on the development of the NPT Monitor, and a project building a framework for Nuclear Harm Reduction. Anahita's expertise focuses on nuclear diplomacy, disarmament, and the global nuclear order, with regional expertise on the Middle East. Previously, she co-coordinated the Emerging Voices Network, and served as Clerk to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation. She was also Programme Manager at the Middle East Treaty Organization, working on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.
Contact: aparsa@basicint.org
